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In Search of a Strategic Alternative 
By
Michael J. Cole 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2013
The complex political landscape of Iran is often excluded from political discourse, 
contributing to oversimplified, at times incoherent policy approaches that reflect 
fundamental misunderstandings and typically undermine rather than complement U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives. Domestic receptivity to international inducements is 
conditioned by specific characteristics o f the domestic political environment. Economic 
sanctions have distributional effects that weaken moderate factions needed to pressure the 
hardline constituencies of the regime. Coercive instruments have strangled Iranian civil 
society, the private sector and the middle-class, severing crucial state-society networks, 
leaving reformist forces vulnerable to the new wave o f hardline conservatism that has, in 
spite of U.S. pressure, gained control o f the state apparatus since 2005. If external 
pressure solidifies the radical faction’s political hold on power while weakening their 




Since 2001, the U.S., in conjunction with other members of the international 
community, has implemented twenty-eight separate forms of sanctions intended to 
pressure the Iranian government’s commitment to a nuclear program (Kreps & Pasha 
2012; 205). These measures include freezing financial assets, tightening export controls, 
and the use of coercive diplomacy; threatening the use o f military force should Iran cross 
the established “red lines.” Though the U.S. relies heavily on the use of sanctions as an 
overall part o f their negotiating strategy, there is a weak causal relationship between the 
economic and political pain inflicted by sanctions and forcing the target state, in this case, 
Iran’s capitulation. As Richard Haass points out, “the problem with economic sanctions is 
that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly 
and even counterproductive” (Haass 1997; 75).
In terms of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, only one question really need 
be asked: are sanctions improving the target state’s compliance? Assessments on the 
efficacy of economic sanctions tend to omit data on whether those sanctions achieve their 
specified goal. In this sense, these assessments take a selective view of history.
According to Western diplomats, the goal of the sanctions imposed on the Iranian state is 
to change the calculations and behavior o f  Iran’s leaders. This is not to assume that the 
U.S., or other sender states are unitary actors. There may well be a diverse array of
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motivations and goals behind the imposition of sanctions on Iran, from inducing policy 
change to weakening the state to provoke regime change. However, these motivations are 
purely speculative. It is for this reason that this research bases its conclusions on what has 
been officially stated as the purpose of economic sanctions, focusing on why, despite the 
intense international economic and political pressure exerted on the Islamic Republic, 
Iran’s acquiescence on the nuclear issue has still not been achieved.
According to the widely cited study from the Institute for International Economics 
(HE), in which 116 cases of sanctions from 1914 to 1990 were analyzed, broad sanctions- 
- i.e. total and financial and trade embargoes— do not have a good track record o f  
changing target countries policies or of pushing them toward democracy (Bahrami &
Trita 2012). In fact, sanctions have a poor record of influencing the behavior of states and 
in many instances, have severely harmed the populations at large, particularly vulnerable 
groups and democratic movements. At times it seems that sanctions are used for the sole 
purpose of placating the advocates of a clenched fist, hardline policy toward Iran. 
Supporters o f the sanctions policy toward Iran conflate the suffering of ordinary Iranian 
people and civil society in general with the weakening o f the regime and its central allies. 
“The real challenge or achievement o f economic sanctions is not the orchestration o f  
economic pain, but the translation of it into effective leverage in a successful negotiating 
strategy” (CFR 2012; 70). This seems nearly impossible given the atmosphere in 
Washington that makes little distinction between the key player’s o f the conservative 
establishment’s nuclear program and the more liberal, reform minded constituents 
interested in restarting dialogue with the West. Mainstream U.S. media portrays the 
Iranian regime as a homogenous political entity unified in its pursuit o f uranium
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enrichment and confrontation with the West. “Rationale and rationalization, systematic 
presentation and symbolism, become so intertwined that it is difficult, even for policy­
makers themselves, to disentangle reality from rhetoric” (Keohane and Nye 1989; 5). The 
reality, as is often the case, is far less black and white than the hyperbolic appraisals that 
inform the average American viewer. The complex political landscape of Iran is often 
excluded from public discourse, contributing to oversimplified, at times incoherent policy 
approaches that reflect fundamental misunderstandings, typically undermining rather than 
complementing U.S. objectives in the region.
An underlining theme in this work is that economic sanctions often create 
unintended consequences that complicate achieving foreign policy objectives, as their 
distributional effects tend to influence behavior in unanticipated ways. I argue that Iran’s 
domestic receptivity to external sanctions and inducements is conditioned by specific 
attributes of the domestic political landscape -namely, the distributional impacts of 
sanctions on different political coalitions (Solingen 2012; 11). This is an often 
overlooked, albeit important, causal mechanism that shapes future policy concessions.
As this paper demonstrates, the impacts of economic sanctions are distributed unevenly 
across Iran’s political spectrum. “The sanctions regime has played into the hands of 
groups with an interest in isolating the country from the global economy and thus making 
denuclearization less likely” (Solingen 2013; 175). Thus, it is crucial that analyses take 
into consideration how the domestic political environment conditions the incentive 
structures of the state’s elite coalitions. Economic sanctions scholar George Lopez (2000; 
14) posits that a key weakness in the sanctions literature is that analyses tend to create a 
misleading impression o f the ineffectiveness of sanctions because they undervalue the
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broader political impact of sanctions. The political implications o f sanctions are indeed 
an important benchmark of the policy’s success. In the case of Iran, however, it is 
precisely due to the broader political impacts that have been a detriment to the overall 
success of sanctions.
This thesis, therefore, focuses on the external and internal pressures that impact 
Iran’s domestic political and economic environment and account for variations in the 
government’s nuclear calculus. The distributional effects o f sanctions and positive 
inducements among different actors play a large role in shaping the Iranian regime’s 
decisions on the nuclear program (Nader 2012; 212). Selecting the form of inducement 
most appropriate in the context o f U.S. foreign policy goals depends a great deal on their 
timing. Non-proliferation strategies that undermine the political leverage of moderate 
coalitions, such as negative inducements, will also undermine U.S. interests. The Iranian 
political environment and the material incentives that shape each coalition’s political and 
economic preferences are important considerations vis-a-vis the effectiveness of 
sanctions. With a more precise understanding of the domestic political processes of the 
Iranian state, focusing particularly on the internal dynamics that shape Iran’s interaction 
with the international community, and the complex factors that condition the policy 
responses o f the regime’s various factions, this analysis illustrates why certain strategies 
are more (or in this case, less) effective in inducing policy change.
This thesis argues that a primary reason for this outcome is that negative 
inducements, specifically economic sanctions, have distributional effects that have 
inadvertently weaken moderate factions needed to pressure the hardline constituencies of 
the regime. In fact, sanctions imposed on Iran are largely responsible for the regime’s
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further entrenchment. While sanctions have done little to affect the regime’s overall 
behavior, draconian sanctions have strangled Iranian civil society, the private sector and 
the middle-class, severing cmcial state-society networks for the moderate forces in 
Iranian politics. The result of which has left the reformist movement vulnerable to the 
new wave of hardline conservatism that has, in spite o f U.S. pressure, gained control of 
the state apparatus since 2005.
Thus, this thesis finds that coercive mechanisms imposed by the international 
community have been ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst. Failing to 
distinguish between potential allies and irreconcilable foes has endangered the reform 
movement in Iran. Any possibility of opposition groups coalescing into a force potent 
enough to initiate reforms is being severely undermined by indiscriminate comprehensive 
sanctions on finance. In other words, sanctions have helped to weaken the very domestic 
forces presumably required to leverage the power of sanctions on the state and its hard­
liner allies.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
This thesis is an observational (small-n) study that applies multiple theories in the 
field to substantiate the research findings. “Social scientists recognize small-n studies as a 
distinctive form of empirical inquiry and an important design for the development and 
evaluation of public policies as well as for developing explanations and testing theories 
of political phenomena” (Johnson & Reynolds 2012; 197). This research relies on 
analyses found in the academic research literature of the field, speeches from both Iranian
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leaders and influential actors within the international community, elite interviews, non­
profit think-tanks reports (e.g. RAND, ICG, ICAN et al.) and relevant documents relating 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
U.S. Presidential orders and United Nations Security Council resolutions. These 
resources allow for a closer examination of the causal processes o f negative inducements 
on the targeted regime.
It is difficult to analyze the numerous institutions, informal and formal networks, 
and personalities that influence processes o f political change in Iran, given the opacity of 
the decision-making and policy processes. Whether sanctions cause, or simply aggravate, 
Iran’s economic predicament and the shift in its domestic environment are not conclusive 
based on the available evidence. “Contemporary world politics is not a seamless web; it 
is a tapestry of diverse relationships. In such a world, one model cannot explain all 
situations” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 4). There are a plethora of unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral measures simultaneously at work, which makes it exceedingly difficult to 
establish a methodological framework to isolate the effects of one restrictive measure 
over another. However, we can assess the aggregate effects of the current sanctions 
regime on Iranian willingness to limit their nuclear program. This thesis, therefore, 
assesses the aggregate impact of measures that have been imposed between 2000-2012. 
The 2000-2012 time-frame selection is based on the stark change in the regime’s nuclear 
strategy. Under the reformist government led by then-president Muhammad Khatami, 
there was an unprecedented level o f cooperation between the U.S. and Iran reaching a 
high point in 2003 when Khatami agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange of 
economic and security concessions. However in 2004, the political climate changed, as
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did the regime’s willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue, which precipitated the 
hard-line conservatives ascendency in Iran’s domestic politics.
In instances in which transparency is limited, as in the case o f Iran, a political 
economy focus on outward versus inward oriented ruling coalitions can be helpful in 
accounting for much of the variation in nuclear restraint across states and within states 
over time (Solingen 2012). This thesis, therefore, is a qualitative political economy 
analysis of the elite coalitions of the Iranian state. This thesis employs a political 
economy framework to highlight Iran’s elite domestic coalitions, their access to power 
and resources, their protected constituencies and bases of support that may account for 
variations in Iran’s nuclear policy. Subsequent chapters explain these variations by 
employing the notions of elite coalition type and regime type. I find that the use of 
negative inducements (threats o f war and economic sanctions) negatively impact Iran’s 
level of receptivity and willingness to cooperate on the issue of uranium enrichment, 
thereby working in a way counterproductive to U.S. policy objectives. In instances in 
which introverted coalitions wield considerable formal and informal influence over the 
state, as is presently the case, negative inducements may initiate a counterproductive 
trajectory that jeopardizes the desired outcome.
Specifically, I show how two characteristics o f the domestic environment — 
"coalition type" and "regime type"— help predict which form of inducement is best suited 
to change the calculations of Iran's leaders regarding the need for nuclear capacities. 
Drawing on the work by Solingen (2012) and Kreps and Pasha (2012), if a ruling 
coalition is introverted (groups opposing integration with the outside world) then it will 
be less receptive to negative inducements. Furthermore, if external pressure solidifies the
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radical elite coalition’s political hold on power while weakening their moderate rivals, 
then it is less likely that the state will embark on a course of denuclearization.
This research adopts a comparative approach at the domestic level of analysis, 
focusing on the elite coalitions that comprise the Iranian state. The case studies used in 
this research apply the theory of the unequal, distributional impacts of negative 
inducements on elite coalitions in Iran. This thesis takes the Reformist movement as a 
case study of the distributional impacts on extroverted coalitions and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC) as a case on the introverted coalitions. Taken 
together, these cases show how economic isolation and the weakening of extroverted 
political rivals benefits the radical right in Iran, facilitating its ascension within the 
political and security bureaucracies of the state. The inclusion o f these case studies in this 
analysis is important because they represent the competing, albeit most influential 
political voices within Iran and reveal the differentiated consequences of negative 
inducements on actors at both ends of the political spectrum. Together, these cases allow 
for a more rigorous assessment of the impact of sanctions on the political, economic and 
societal spheres of the state and why the results of which may be at odds with their 
intended purpose—changing the calculations of Iranian leaders.
There are distinct advantages to using comparative case studies. They allow for 
greater depth and description so that there is greater degree of conceptual clarity in 
testing a theoretical framework. Instead of looking at several features across numerous 
cases, a case study examines numerous diverse features of the case in greater depth 
(Neuman 2012). For the purposes of this research, a case study method was chosen to 
provide greater depth to the phenomena o f the distributional impacts o f sanctions that not
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only spillover into the political but the economic and social as well. The use of case 
studies allows for the investigation of nuances lost when political processes are 
generalized abstractions or numerical indicators (Fortna 2008).
As with every approach to social science research, qualitative case studies also 
have shortcomings and weaknesses. This thesis focuses primarily on the state of Iran, its 
economy, society and principle actors. The extent to which these findings are 
generalizable is contingent on replicating these research findings across other cases. 
Therefore, it is not certain that the findings o f this research can be generalized to other 
contexts without further analysis of additional cases. Nevertheless, the framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of sanctions applied here serves as a starting point for further 
research in similar cases in which sanctions are imposed.
The essential theoretical argument presented in this thesis is twofold. The first is 
that the domestic coalition’s economic orientation (“coalition type”) is an important 
characteristic that helps predict the way in which a coalition will respond to external 
pressure. In this case, if a coalition is introverted, such as the IRGC, then it will be less 
receptive to negative inducements e.g. comprehensive or targeted sanctions and military 
threats. The primary reason why the introverted coalition will be less receptive to 
negative inducements is that sanctions, threats and segregation from the global economy 
compliments their long-range political and economic goals and facilitates their 
consolidation of power over domestic institutions. “Inward-looking leaders generally 
oppose integration because their domestic support comes from the military-industrial 
sector that depends on state subsidies, state bureaucracies themselves, and protected 
industries” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 178). Introverted coalitions have a greater incentive to
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. maintain the status quo because external threats are used to justify an increase in military 
spending, which creates more revenues to establish patronage and clientage systems, and 
also justifies their institutional legitimacy and the repression of their political rivals. In 
Iran, threats of war and economic sanctions have empowered hardline coalitions while 
paradoxically weakening the domestic position of moderate coalitions. It is clear that 
sanctions produce differentiated consequences among the various actors in the domestic 
context. This is precisely the reason why the distributional impact of sanctions across 
domestic actors must be accounted for when crafting inducements.
The impact of the sanctions creates an ideal domestic environment for introverted 
groups such as the IRGC, helping them consolidate their power over informal as well as 
formal networks and institutions of the state and society over the past decade. I argue that 
military, economic or rhetorical threats (i.e. coercive diplomacy), strengthen coalitions 
that stymie international economic integration, resist international regimes, and privilege 
domestic industries, including the same nuclear program that outside threats hope to 
undermine (Solingen 2012). Kreps and Pasha eloquently map the causal logic as to why 
negative inducements strengthen introverts while undermining extroverts.
Negative inducements lead to-> a strengthening o f inward-looking 
coalitions wary of integration into the global economy-> which deepens 
their ability to strengthen monopolies, protectionism, import 
substitution, and the military-industrial complex, including the nuclear 
program. Conversely, these negative inducements-> undermine the 
target state’s international environment and ability to attract foreign 
investm ents these conditions undercut extroverted coalitions seeking to 
integrate with the global economy-> thus, weakening domestic 
proponents of a more conciliatory nuclear policy (Kreps & Pasha 2012).
10
The threat of military force plays into the narrative propagated by the radical coalitions, 
and is instrumentalized to justify a prolonged state of emergency. Mobilizing for external 
defense is a customary strategy of the IRGC to rally their political base of support and 
consolidate formal control over domestic institutions. The utility of an external menace to 
keep Iran on war footing and distract the populace from the regime’s own economic 
failings has long been a feature o f the Islamic Republic’s official discourse (Wehrey et al. 
2009). “Standard diversionary theory argues that inter-state confrontation can improve 
internal cohesion and result in a “rally” effect which boosts the leading coalition’s 
political position” (Davies 2012; 323). Inflammatory rhetoric from the outside, direct 
threats and the heightened state of emergency caused, or at least justified by sanctions, 
helps to cultivate a domestic political environment that is conducive to the expansion of 
inwardly-oriented or introverted groups in nearly every aspect o f Iranian life and society. 
Threats of military force reinforce their threat narrative, which provides a useful 
diversionary tactic to reorient public anger toward the outside. “This is particularly the 
case if the inward-looking coalition has built its narrative around the idea that nuclear 
weapons are an instrument for defending against unwanted international influence”
(Kreps & Pasha 2012; 178).
The second half of the theoretical argument also looks to the domestic 
environment as it provides the context in which external inducements operate. The 
domestic characteristic o f  “regime type” also conditions the state’s response to external, 
negative inducements. I argue that an authoritarian regime is less receptive to negative 
inducements than a democratic regime. In an authoritarian context, leaders and 
governments have many ways to insulate themselves, and designing “smart” sanctions to
11
target only them is extraordinarily difficult (Haass 1997). Sanctions also have the 
unintended consequence o f legitimizing a regime’s grip over the political and economic 
spheres of the state and provide a significant advantage in maintaining its power. A  
domestic political environment in a state o f emergency or under siege enables the regime 
to batten down the hatches in terms of repressing oppositional and civil society 
mobilization, diverting attention away from domestic troubles as well as necessitating 
strict control o f the country’s vital resources. For example, “by creating scarcity, 
[sanctions] enable governments to better control the distribution of goods; and they create 
a general sense o f siege that governments can exploit to maintain political control”
(Haass 1997; 80). This is especially the case for the IRGC, who, because of their 
pervasive influence in domestic politics, are well positioned to benefit from the structural 
changes to Iran’s economy under sanctions. This dynamic closes off previously existing 
opportunity structures for the reform movement to mobilize against the regime. In a 
domestic environment that demands unity and punishes dissent, the oppositional voices, 
in this case the Reformist coalition, are expelled from the corridors of power and 
marginalized to the periphery of domestic politics.
Thus, in the same way that the coalition type reveals the way in which a coalition 
will respond to external coercion, the type of regime, that is, the nature of its domestic 
institutions (authoritarian v. democratic) helps to predict how vulnerable the regime will 
be to external pressure (Solingen 2012). As the research presented below demonstrates, 
autocratic regimes have an easier time mitigating the negative effects of sanctions than do 
democratic regimes. By diverting the pressure of financial burdens away from the key 
players of the regime and onto ordinary Iranians and its political adversaries, autocratic
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regimes can insulate themselves from the paralyzing effects of sanctions. Thus, sanctions 
are not as effective on less transparent regimes.
Before moving on, I would like to briefly clarify a few terms key to the argument 
presented in this thesis. An inducement, a mechanism that may induce someone to do 
something, may be a positive incentive, or conversely, a negative punishment. When 
using the term “negative inducements,” I refer to the collective impact o f  both military 
threats and comprehensive economic sanctions. The term, model for political survival 
refers to an elite political coalition’s orientation for taking strategic decisions, interacting 
with domestic and international actors and integrating with the global economy. In most 
cases, coalitions represent a broad range of interests and values that do not fit neatly into 
any one categorization. In the interest of clarity, however, one can posit the model of 
political survival as following between two ideal types: extroverted (internationalizing) 
and introverted (inward-looking) perspectives.
Extroverted coalitions seek global economic integration and participation in 
international institutions as a way to promote modernization and reduce uncertainty. As 
Solingen (2012; 12) notes, “Internationalizing coalitions require political and economic 
stability to reduce uncertainty and maximize access to foreign markets, resources, capital, 
investments, aid, and technology.” In contrast, inward-looking coalitions reject the global 
economy as an engine o f industrialization and moreover, “tend to emphasize economic 
nationalism-sometimes dressed in rigid religious identities- casting ambitious nuclear 
programs as tools of modernization and symbols of defiance against perceived dominant 
global political and economic orders” (Solingen 2012; 11). As we take a closer look at 
the actors on Iran’s domestic stage, the implications o f  each model o f  political survival
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on the country’s nuclear position and interaction with the outside world will become 
clearer.
Overview o f Chapter Contents
Cortright and Lopez (2000; 32) posit that the traditional criteria for assessing the 
effectiveness of sanctions have been too narrow. This thesis attempts to broaden the 
scope of analysis to consider the social, humanitarian, political and economic impacts of 
sanctions across the spectrum of diverse actors in Iran’s domestic environment. There 
must be greater focus on the internal dynamics of the target state to assess the 
differentiated impacts of sanctions on the elite actors of the state and society. The media 
tend to offer vague portrayals of the Islamic Republic, depicting Iran as an irrational state 
actor. “Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by “mad 
mullahs” but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders” 
(Waltz 2012; 4). Power and policy oscillate from moderate to fundamentalist, cooperative 
to confrontational as diverse domestic coalitions operate in the context o f a highly 
complex, fragmented political terrain. The intense factional rivalries in Iran, driven by 
competing ideologies and visions, have shaped Iran’s economic and foreign policies since 
the 1979 revolution. Conflating domestic polities under a general title o f radical or ‘evil’ 
misses the fundamental point that the incentive structure of each domestic coalition and 
faction is different, and therefore will likely respond differently to external influences 
(Solingen 2012). “Although Iran’s leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, 
they show no propensity for self-destruction” (Waltz 2012; 4). Incendiary speeches made
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by Iranian leaders are primarily tailored for domestic consumption and should not be 
considered a window into the real intentions o f the regime’s dominant actors. The 
subsequent chapters map the domestic political landscape of Iran to provide insight into 
the country’s political complexity and eliminate some o f the misconceptions that 
constrain outsiders’ abilities to engage in informed policy decisions.
Past studies have portrayed the Iran as an omnipresent structure or actor, 
homogenizing extremely complex features o f the state. An appropriate metaphor for the 
Islamic Republic is to think of Iran not as an apple, or one unitary, coherent actor, but as 
a cluster of grapes. The grapes represent all the various political and economic groups 
within Iran vying to assert their interests and ideology on the state. There are some grapes 
that are larger and more developed than others and there are some grapes that are bruised 
and fragile. Some may be highly interconnected while others exist on the periphery with 
very few linkages at all. This situation is reflective of the Iranian regime, which has been 
divided since it was established in 1979.
The fragmentation o f Iran’s political landscape can be categorized into four 
distinct coalitions or blocs, moving from political left to right; Reformists, Conservative 
Pragmatists, Conservative Traditionalists, and Radicals (Neo-Principalists). In order to 
establish a clear delineation between coalitions, this analysis divides these groups further 
into the categories of Islamic Left and the Islamic Right. This categorization is based on 
the political preferences of each coalition. Whereas the elite coalitions of the Islamic Left 
promote a more liberal society in which the controls on civil society are relaxed, the 
Islamic Right adheres to the rigid principles of the Islamic Revolution and envisions a 
religiously homogenous society with strict controls on society. The left-right dichotomy
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is more complicated in regards to their economic preferences. Whereas the Islamic Left 
primary engages in a development-oriented economic strategy, the Islamic Right’s 
economic approach is predicated on redistributive policies. Both the Islamic Left and 
Right prefer domestic economic policies that are sympathetic to the statist economic left. 
However, a clear distinction can be made in terms of their relationship with the global 
economy and their respective modes o f political survival-introverted v. extroverted. The 
various Reformist groups and the Pragmatic Conservatives comprise the Islamic political 
Left while the Islamic Right is made up of the two aforementioned sub-factions: the 
Pragmatic Traditionalists and the far-right, ultra-conservative Neo-Principalists. The 
domestic environment in Iran can also be divided based on the three distinct epochs in 
which each coalition held the reins of power: the Pragmatic Conservative era (1989- 
1997); the Reformist era (1997-2005); and the Neo-Principalist era beginning in 2005 and 
continuing through to the present time (Safshekan 2010).
One major goal of this thesis is to distinguish between the Iranian domestic 
coalitions willing to bring about a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and those 
groups who have an interest in escalating tensions and maintaining economic isolation. 
Identifying each coalition’s ideological aims, constituencies, economic preferences, and 
access to resources and power are the factors underpinning this distinction. Chapter II 
assesses the distributional impact o f economic sanctions on the Islamic Left as well as the 
urban middle class and civil society. I argue that the prospect o f fostering a counter­
regime grassroots movement needed to pressure the regime is under threat because many 
Iranian citizens are even more vulnerable, and thus, more dependent on the government 
they wish to reform. Chapter III o f this analysis examines the distributional effects of
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sanctions on the Islamic Right. I pay special attention to the ultra-conservative, hardliner 
coalition, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and argue that negative 
inducements facilitate their socio-economic and political expansion into Iran’s state and 
security apparatus, as well as informal corridors o f power, accounting for their overall 
contribution to the current nuclear stalemate. This chapter will focus on the ways in 
which the hardliners— i.e. introverted coalitions— have been politically and economically 
strengthened as a direct and indirect result of external pressure. The advocates of 
weaponizing the nuclear program are presently benefiting from the economic isolation 
brought on by sanctions because their power is derived from an introverted political 
economy model which benefits from protectionism, strict import controls and the 
removal of foreign influence. The Revolutionary Guards have been able to adapt to the 
rapidly changing economic environment under sanctions because o f its privileged 
position throughout Iran’s domestic political institutions. As this dire situation persists 
and continues to suffocate the reform movement, the probability of Iranian capitulation 
on the nuclear issue is less likely to occur.
The concluding chapter o f this thesis looks to strategic policy alternatives to 
coercive diplomacy that could alleviate the confrontational atmosphere o f international 
negotiations and put an end to the nuclear crisis. For negotiations to be effective, an 
incremental process of building trust and respect on both sides o f the table must be 
initiated. This is easier said than done since the dreary history o f coercive diplomacy 
shows that all too often, threats and promises undercut, rather than complement each 
other (Jervis 2013). As it stands now, there are more domestic political advantages in 
pursuing a policy of nuclear resistance in Iran than there are international incentives to
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cooperate. Support for Iran’s increasing level of nuclear resistance is evident in elite 
speeches, interviews, the regime’s economic adjustment policies and the mere fact that 
tensions still remain high surrounding the regime’s unwillingness to suspend its uranium 
enrichment program. If there is any hope of stalling the march toward war, there must be 
greater effort to produce a negotiating strategy that is sensitive to Iran’s security 
concerns, material incentives, internal dynamics and regional ambitions that could help to 




The Distributional Effects of Negative Inducements on the Islamic Left
Domestic and regional environments shape the incentive structures o f elite 
coalitions that comprise the state. Each coalition has preferences, interests and vantage 
points that can be altered due to changes in the domestic and international political 
environments. Power relations, bargaining among domestic groups and changing 
international conditions shape state interests and policies (Karns & Mingst 2004). 
Sanctions and inducements affect individuals (leaders, producers, consumers, rent- 
seekers, and others) who respond to them in ways that shape collective outcomes 
(Solingen 2012; 10).
This chapter begins by analyzing the moderate groups that comprise the Islamic 
Left, and then examines how changing regional conditions and external inducements alter 
their domestic position and ability to influence internal political outcomes. I argue that 
the differentiated impact of negative inducements (e.g. threats of military force) coupled 
with economic sanctions have been deleterious for extroverted coalitions such as the 
reform movement, the urban middle class and civil society groups in Iran. I show how the 
groups most likely to push for cooperation with the West and internal democratization 
have been economically marginalized, made more politically vulnerable, and found 
everyday life more difficult as a result o f the sanctions regime. The problem with this
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type of broad-brush approach is that sanctions tend to affect the general population, while 
those in government and the military are able to skirt the sanctions (Haass 1997; 79).
The Islamic Left
The Reformists are the most moderate faction in Iranian politics, essentially 
representing the reorganization of the political left that emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s. 
In 1988, moderate clergy members split from the Association o f Militant Clergy, Jameeh 
Rowhaniyyat-e Mobarez, and formed the Society of Militant Clergy, Majma-e 
Rowhaniyoun-e Mobarez (Wehrey et al. 2009). The Islamic Left of today is composed of 
various reformist groups such as the pro-Khatami Islamic Iran Participation Front and 
Mehdi Karroubi’s National Trust Party (Nader 2012; 217). The reformists represent the 
internationalizing, extroverted model of political survival. Though all political coalitions 
in Iran subscribe to the concept of a theocratic state ruled according to the velayat-e 
faghih i.e. rule of the supreme jurist, the political left favors a more developed and free 
civil society, greater transparency and pluralism in the political system and integration 
with the global economy to promote economic growth. “Though previously espousing 
socialistic and statist economic policies, the Islamic Left has increasingly favored less 
state control over the economy” (Nader 2012; 217). The most vital constituencies o f  the 
Reformist coalition include Iran’s intelligentsia (i.e. liberal writers and students), the 
middle and professional classes, activist groups for women’s rights and other minority 
rights as well as various other groups attempting to loosen the government’s control on 
civil society.
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During the Reformist era between 1997-2005, there was an unprecedented degree 
of cooperation between Iran and its most fierce regional and international rivals. Former 
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was also able to foster a much more tolerant 
Iranian society during his tenure in the late 1990s. A 2004 World Bank report claimed, 
“after 24 years marked by internal post-revolutionary strife, international isolation, and 
deep economic volatility, Iran is slowly emerging from a long period of uncertainty and 
stability” (Nader 2012; 219). (Nearly a decade later, we now know that this optimism was 
premature and short-lived.) Then-president Khatami introduced the notion of the 
“Dialogue among Civilizations” calling for the normalizing o f relations between the 
Islamic nations of the world and the international community based on mutual respect 
and common purpose. In addition, following the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
Iran assisted the U.S. in the overthrow of the Taliban government and committed over 
$500 million in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic did, of course 
have in interest in seeing the destruction the Taliban, since they were on the verge of war 
with the problematic Sunni extremist organization in 1997; nevertheless, this was 
considered to be a break through in U.S.-Iran relations and the possible start to a new era 
of mutual understanding and cooperation. In 2003, a remarkable breakthrough took place 
during negotiations between Iran and members of the EU3, Britain, France and Germany 
in which Tehran agreed to suspend its nuclear program and voluntarily agreed to uphold 
the additional protocol of the IAEA safeguard agreement. Ray Takeyh (2009; 247) points 
out that Khatami’s suspension o f the program was not a cynical p loy .. .it was a genuine 
attempt to determine what Iran could gain in terms of security assurances and economic 
concessions for its voluntary act o f suspension.
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The hardliner factions, though politically marginalized at the time, vehemently 
opposed many of Khatami’s initiatives, especially the suspension o f the nuclear program 
and sought out any opportunity to undermine his agenda. The Reform government’s 
detractors claimed that Khatami and his allies were ‘tired revolutionaries’ who 
abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution. Surprisingly, this courageous new 
foreign policy ended up being severely undermined not by the competing coalitions 
within Iran’s domestic landscape, but by careless accusations made by the Bush 
Administration. During the January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, George W. Bush 
uttered a phrase heard around the world. Bush proclaimed that North Korea, Iraq and Iran 
constituted the world’s “axis of evil”, and stated that the destruction of these regimes had 
become a vital nation security interest. Shortly thereafter, National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice clarified the administration's position on Iran. "Iran's direct support of 
regional and global terrorism," she said, "and its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed in the days after the world's worst 
terrorist attacks in history" (PBS Frontline 2007). Following this diplomatic faux pas, the 
streets of Tehran were overflowing with enraged citizens condemning the U.S., giving 
the conservative movement an opportunity to fan the flames and raise the country’s threat 
perception. Thus, for the Reform government, it became extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to credibly promote dialogue with the West. By May of 2002, Khamenei 
openly dismissed the possibility o f diplomatic engagement and the brief glimmer of hope 
to restart relations between the U.S. and Iran was extinguished. “External threats make 
the domestic economic objective of broader integration more difficult, since the
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possibility of military force destabilizes the domestic economy and discourages foreign 
investment” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 180).
Washington’s bellicose rhetoric damaged the reform movement’s reputation and 
left them politically vulnerable to the hardliner coalitions, who framed Khatami’s policies 
as weak and claimed that his faction were nothing more than puppets of foreign regimes. 
The combination o f Washington’s rhetoric and ensuing actions allowed the hardliner 
factions back into the political mainstream. When the dust settled it became impossible 
for the Reform agenda to gain traction with the conservative establishment, especially the 
supreme leader. Without the allied support of the supreme leader and his powerful 
domestic coalition, the reform agenda stalled and soon after, Iranian citizens became 
weary o f  the moderates’ inability to effectively govern and enact the promised 
institutional reforms. In a sense, the neo-conservative government in Washington helped 
the rise of the neo-conservative coalition in Tehran.
These developments indicate how incendiary rhetoric (e.g. threats o f military 
force) undermines the strength of internationalizing or extroverted coalitions. The 
reformers’ strength draws from the ability to promote economic linkages, which are far 
more complicated in the face o f military force (Kreps & Pasha 2012). In the context of 
the Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda o f regime change in Iraq and the 
subsequent asymmetrical shift in power relations in the Middle East, Iranian leaders 
became increasingly anxious regarding Washington’s intentions toward Iran. Far from 
Iran lamenting the demise of Saddam Hussein, the speed at which he met his demise 
lingered in the minds o f the clerical establishment, alerting them to their country’s 
strategic vulnerability to the ambitious superpower. The recalculating of Iran’s strategic
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vulnerability on the part o f  Iran’s clerical establishment is evident in the subsequent 
change in attitudes toward the U.S. The ‘Axis o f  Evil’ speech signified a dramatic turning 
point not only in U.S.-Iran relations but also in the domestic balance o f power in Iranian 
politics. The ripple effect of this development continues to influence the confrontational 
context of the nuclear debate today.
The second elite coalition represents the center of Iranian politics. The 
Conservative Pragmatists are a hybrid political faction that gravitates toward the 
Reformists regarding matters of the economy but is more conservative regarding cultural 
issues. Economically, the Pragmatists subscribe to a top-down, ‘China Model’ o f  
modernization, arguing for increased financial and technical cooperation with the West 
but not for greater democratization of state institutions (Wehrey et al. 2009). “These 
groups perceive little benefit from a policy of nuclear assertion or ambiguity, both for 
domestic and international reasons, and have been more amenable to relinquishing 
nuclear programs that might place barriers to international economic access” (Solingen 
2012; 13). The Conservative Pragmatists live up to their name as they often choose 
pragmatism over ideological fervor and are, at times, willing to sacrifice revolutionary 
prestige in favor of compromise. This bloc has, at times, reversed its position in domestic 
affairs, which provoked criticism from both the moderates and the conservatives as being 
political opportunists. This reflects the eclectic nature o f Pragmatists, representing a 
diverse collection of interests and values. Their primary constituents are typically the 
urban middle classes, bazaari merchants and former and current government technocrats. 
The Conservative Pragmatists exhibit a composite model o f political survival, one that 
includes internationalizing and introverted tendencies.
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Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, known as the saradar-e sazandegi or “generalissimo 
o f reconstruction,” pursued pragmatic foreign policies so to help carry out his economic 
agenda aimed at greater integration with the global economy. Under Rafsanjani, Iran 
abandoned its efforts at exporting the revolution to other Shi’a states and improved 
relations with Sunni-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani also garnered 
support from technocratic officials in many of the state’s economic ministries who shared 
his vision of a more capitalist system of Islamic rule. However, “the Pragmatists’ efforts 
at economic reform were blocked by the Traditionalists, whose monopolistic control of 
the economy would have been endangered by greater domestic and international 
competition” (Nader 2012; 219). Despite the Pragmatists’ contribution to the 
development o f Iran’s infrastructure following the devastating eight-year war with Iraq, 
the benefits were not visible enough for the poorer classes as the general population 
failed to see the oil money reach their dinner tables. It is for this reason that the Islamic 
Right’s redistributive policies gained overwhelming support from the lower 
socioeconomic, mral and urban classes in following years.
Since the Pragmatists are amenable to revisiting ineffective or harmful policies, 
regardless of ideological affiliation, they could prove to be a crucial ally for the Reform 
movement and its more moderate agenda o f resuming multilateral engagement. 
Developing attractive incentives for cooperation presupposes awareness of their interests, 
however. Again, understanding the domestic political processes in Iran is the only way to 
discover which actors may be more receptive to external inducements and willing to 
return to negotiations than others. In order to bring about a more realistic possibility of 
obtaining cooperation and a pathway to agreement on the nuclear question, it is important
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to address these moderate factions’ domestic pressures as well as their constituent and 
institutional loyalties. Pragmatic and moderate coalitions will only support a cooperative 
policy with the West only if cooperation is believed to be in their best interest and only if 
it will strengthen their respective domestic positions.
The current sanctions regime that imposes conditions o f international isolation is 
detrimental to these moderate groups seeking dialogue with the international community. 
Extroverted coalitions, who draw their strength by creating economic interconnectedness 
with the outside world and by providing conditions conducive to foreign investment, 
have been pushed from the corridors o f power in Iran. The domestic costs of negotiating 
are rising as cooperating with the West is no longer a politically salient option. The new 
generation o f financial sanctions has ostensibly targeted the various nodes that connect 
Iran to the global economy. The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iran cause 
significant decreases in private sector domestic production and sever reformist coalitions 
from the political power traditionally derived from their economic activities and 
associations with formal institutions.
The economic costs are clear. The fledging private sector is unable to import the 
necessary raw materials for manufacturing and the banking sanctions are causing a virtual 
standstill in imports and exports of legitimate businesses (ICAN 2012). Prior to 2006 
(between 1996-2006) and before the financial sanctions that froze Iranian assets were 
imposed, over 6 million new jobs were created. According to former Iranian Central 
Bank researcher Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, however, between 2006 and the present, zero 
new jobs have been created and unemployment has risen to record highs. Meanwhile, the 
government is expanding its reach into the private sector by privatizing former state
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assets and selling them to the regime’s closest allies, thus giving groups like the IRGC a 
strategic economic advantage over its domestic competitors.
Unlike past sanctions, like the kind imposed on regimes such as Libya and 
Iraq, which only focused on the ‘illegal’ transfer o f funds and money 
laundering, the Iranian sanctions are not related to a specific sector or 
industry nor to business entities or specific individuals. This economic 
uncertainty due to sanctions is causing stagnation for the private sector, 
while some businessmen point out that companies affiliated with the state, 
e.g. IRGC, are exploiting the situation as they have access to government 
exchange rates (ICAN 2012; 10).
The moderate coalitions are not only weakened economically, and thus politically, they 
are losing a major aspect of their power within civil society and the ability to exert 
grassroots pressure on the regime. Social theorist Sidney Tarrow (1998; 88) notes that 
reform is most likely when challenges from outside the polity provide a political 
incentive for elites within it to advance their own policies and careers. In this case, these 
challenges from the outside (i.e. economic sanction) are a detriment for the elites 
pursuing reformist policies but have, however, created opportunities for the introverted 
elites to thrive under the status quo. In the absence of counter-regime mobilization and 
sustained collective action from the Islamic Left, pressuring the regime’s capitulation and 
reform makes for a very unlikely outcome.
Constraints on Contention
Traditional analyses on the effectiveness o f sanctions (see David A. Baldwin) 
have been confined to indicators of economic and social deterioration and the subsequent
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political choices o f the target nation’s leadership (Cortright & Lopez 2000). Sanction 
optimists hope or assume that sanctions will create sufficient pressure on the regime to 
bring Iran to the negotiating table regarding its nuclear policy. “In this framework, 
sanctions are supposed to exact political change that is directly proportionate to the 
economic hardship experienced” (Cortright & Lopez 2000; 19). As an International Crisis 
Group report noted, “Behind the sanctions policy lies the hope that growing popular 
discontent will confront the regime with a stark choice: altering its nuclear policy or 
running the risk o f  popular unrest” (ICG 2013; 31). However, sanctions are having a 
long-term negative impact on the source o f societal change in Iran as they undermine the 
ability to mobilize and affect internal reforms. In other words, sanctions are not only 
failing to induce sufficient social pressure on the government to force a change in policy, 
they are creating barriers to those very forces seeking reform. “By reducing the scope of 
independent action,” argued Haass, sanctions can work against forces promoting political 
pluralism” (1997; 80). Specifically, the urban middle class that has historically played a 
central role in creating change and promoting progress in Iran are key casualties of the 
sanctions regime (ICAN 2012).
Civil society groups are rapidly losing influence in Iranian society. Volunteerism 
is nearly impossible due to economic uncertainty caused by the rotating schedules of 
escalating sanctions. “Sanctions and in particular, the limitations placed on the transfer o f 
funds, has created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged in health and 
medical services, education efforts, support for orphans and disadvantaged women and 
children to carry out their work” (ICAN 2012; 7). Many o f these organizations have 
ceased operations entirely.
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Furthermore, the confrontation with the West is making it difficult for grassroots 
groups and urban protesters to criticize government policies for fear of being accused of 
treason. Debilitating sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric o f war elevates national 
security concerns and further diminishes the state’s tolerance o f  internal dissent (ICAN 
2012). Any opposition to government policies is framed as tacit support for external 
enemies under the auspices of reform.
Security challenges imposed by their own government already curtail civil 
society’s ability to attend regional and international conferences. But the policies of other 
governments further complicate their lives (ICAN 2012). Unable to use international 
banks to transfer funds or to obtain visas to travel abroad, activists, like all regular Iranian 
citizens, are unable to access basic services that could perhaps be used to foment 
solidarity between reform-minded individuals and organizations across the world. 
“Activist groups, already facing harsh repression, have seen their limited financial 
resources dry up; restrictions on the export of communications technology from the U.S. 
has severely hindered the flow o f information” (ICG 2013; 37).
The use of external resources is crucial in building a movement that is able to 
disseminate and frame its messages to millions of people to encourage greater 
participation and widespread support. Sidney Tarrow (1998; 124) claims, “the most 
effective forms of organization are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted 
local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations.” In 
instances in which social networks are severed, so too is the ability to mobilize supporters 
rapidly and exert pressure on the state through established institutions. Social movements 
face great hurdles in sustaining confrontation with opponents, maintaining a broad
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support base, and containing fissiparous tendencies, and many thus simply disappear 
(Tarrow 1998).
External resources, exposure, and attention can help sustain a mass movement. 
Thus, just when contact with and solidarity from the outside world are most needed, 
Iranians are faced with the greatest level of isolation. As an Iranian analyst concluded:
The domestic actors striving to change the behavior of the Iranian state, it 
turns out, do not merely constitute unfortunate collateral damage. They are 
the direct recipients of policies that deny them protective tools, leaving 
them vulnerable to significantly more powerful entities which always find 
ways to get around sanctions and access instruments of repression (Fahri 
2012b).
The practical downside to economic sanctions is that it weakens potential allies within 
the target population. This poses several problems for the U.S. and for grassroots 
mobilization against the Iranian leadership. First, it is difficult for sanctions to be 
effective in the absence o f  a so called “transmission mechanism” whereby civilian 
suffering could translate into actual policy changes (Palkki & Smith 2012). The 
elimination of connective structures, such as the free flow of information amongst civic 
activists, has effectively undermined any hope of translating the suffering of the Iranian 
population into a collective action scenario in which the regime would be openly 
challenged. The reformist coalitions have been stripped of their economic sources of 
support, and therefore, political leverage to pressure the regime and effectively represent 
ordinary Iranians. Rising tensions with the U.S. and its allies and the subsequent punitive 
measures imposed to bring Iran in line with its international treaty obligations creates a 
prolonged state of emergency that prevents opposition groups from vocalizing their 
disapproval o f  the regime’s policies. In the absence o f the extroverted coalitions’
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economic influence, the patronage system of government elites has been able to deflect 
much of the anger emanating from the population, which has largely protected the regime 
from social upheaval. In addition, civic organizational structures and networks have 
dissipated as financial resources have evaporated. It is in this way that economic 
sanctions are weakening civil society actors, reform-oriented members o f Iranian society, 
democratic and women’s groups, supplanting their influence and ability to engage in 
contentious politics.
Humanitarian Costs o f  Coercive Diplomacy
Policy-makers consider sanctions to be a preferable non-violent alternative to less 
diplomatic methods of coercion. However, there are hidden costs to this strategy that 
appear less like diplomacy and more like economic warfare. The banking sanctions that 
were implemented in December 2011 have wreaked havoc on ordinary Iranian citizens to 
an unprecedented extent, which has numerous unintended consequences on the already 
fractious landscape o f Iran’s domestic politics. A majority o f  Iranians (56%) say 
U.N./U.S. sanctions have hurt Iranians livelihoods a great deal. Separately, 48% say 
sanctions have affected their own personal livelihoods a great deal (Gallup 2013). 
According to Iranian economist, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, from 2006-2011, zero new jobs 
have been created for the middle classes. The unemployment rate for women is now over 
30% while men experience 20-25% unemployment. The Iranian youth have been hit the 
hardest: 30% of men 18-25 years of age are unemployed while over 50% of women in the 
same age group are struggling to find work.
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UN Security Council sanctions on Iran (S/R ES/1696,1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 
1803,1835 (2008), 1887 (2009) and 1929 (2010) creates food shortages, soaring prices 
on public goods and services, exacerbates economic, political and social instability, as 
well as heightens the sense of injustice that Iran is treated unfairly by the international 
community and the United States in particular. According to a report by the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the West’s sanctions regime against Iran 
contributes to shortages of humanitarian goods by disrupting the supply chain from 
foreign manufacturer to the Iranian patient in need of medicine (USIP 2013). “Reports of 
widespread shortages of specialized medicines for cancer patients, hemophiliacs and 
individuals suffering from diabetes, multiple sclerosis and other serious conditions are 
numerous” (ICG 2013; 34).
According to a December 2012 Gallup poll, thirty-one percent of Iranians rated 
their lives poorly enough to be considered “suffering,” one o f  the highest rates in the 
greater Middle East and North Africa region (Gallup 2013).1 Countries with similar 
“suffering” rates are typically war-torn areas such as Afghanistan, Syria, and sub-Saharan 
African states. Prices of basic food, clothes, and electronic goods have soared as a result 
of international sanctions and a plummeting currency; the rial has more than halved in 
value over the past year. Nobody believes the official figure of 24% for the annual rate of 
inflation (Economist 2012a). “To be sure, there are signs o f  public anger related to the 
economic downturn. Much criticism is directed at the regime, but there are also 
indications that the West increasingly is blamed for what is viewed as a form of 
collective punishment” (ICG 2013; 31). According to that same 2012 Gallup Poll, only
1 Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted Dec. 16, 2012- 
Jan. 10, 2013, in Iran. For results based on the total sample o f national adults, one can say with 95% 
confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3.8 percentage points.
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around 10 per cent of the population holds the Iranian government accountable for the 
economic downturn. “People do not necessarily see a correlation between an increase in 
the price of domestically produced goods and sanctions. So they blame the government. 
But shortages of medicine have changed the dynamics, and people increasingly blame the 
West for their predicament” (ICG 2013; 31).
Conclusion
As this chapter has showed, despite conventional wisdom, sanctions tend to be a 
blunt instrument, the effects of which spillover beyond the target government and onto 
the civilian population. Sanctions assessments seem only to focus on areas in which 
government institutions and sectors are directly affected, however, these reports tend to 
completely omit the devastation imposed on Iranian citizens and the reformist clusters of 
its civil society. It is obvious that sanctions hurt economies but it’s important to consider 
who, specifically, gets hurt. Economic sanctions are not an alternative to war but are 
rather tantamount to war. In essence, sanctions constitute a form of collective punishment 
levied against an entire population, indiscriminate of potential allies and vulnerable 
segments of the population. Comprehensive sanctions against Iran are too broad to 
impact the behavior of the government. Instead they target the population. As Haass 
noted:
The danger inherent in broad sanctions-beyond missing the true target- is 
both moral, in that innocents are affected, and practical, in that sanctions 
that harm the general population can bring about undesired effects, 
including strengthening the regime, triggering large scale emigration, and 
retarding the emergence of a middle class and a civil society (Haass 1997;
79).
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The U.S. has a strategic interest to maintain a good relationship with the Iranian people. 
“Ordinary Iranians are suffering from policies o f  confrontation on which they have never 
been consulted” (Economist Aug 18 2012). A relaxation on financial restrictions may, in 
fact, open up a safety valve for democratic and reform movements to re-establish 
operations in civil society and regain some of the waning support o f the population by 
solidifying its previous system of patronage in urban centers. Further reliance on 
economic sanctions will continue to produce unintended consequences that will 
inevitably complicate the actualization of its stated goals.
Khatami’s reformist government demonstrated to the world that Iran could 
moderate its foreign policy and balance its nuclear ambitions in the context of its 
additional goals, such as integration into the global economy. Iran’s willingness to 
suspend its nuclear program was instead met with threats o f regime change from 
Washington, dramatically altering Tehran’s strategic calculations, threat perception and 
its domestic balance of power.
Current non-proliferation strategies via economic sanctions have created 
conditions in Iran that are counterproductive for extroverted domestic coalitions and 
reform-oriented civil society organizations, often viewed as the catalysts of collective 
action. Financial restrictions and the severing of connective structures in formal and 
informal networks contribute to the demise o f the groups needed to engage in collective 
action to force the regime’s capitulation. The financial embargo imposed on ordinary 
Iranian citizens has severely limited their ability mobilize, organize and exploit 
opportunities to exert pressure on the regime. In their absence, the ultra-conservative
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coalitions have asserted their hegemony over the economic, political and societal 
institutions of Iran, relegating their reformist counterparts to near irrelevance.
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Chapter III:
The Distributional Effects o f Negative Inducements on the Islamic Right
Negative inducements, both economic and rhetorical, have produced different 
outcomes across the spectrum o f actors on Iran’s domestic stage. Segregating Iran from 
the global economy presents opportunities for some groups while encouraging the demise 
for others. The distributional impact of negative inducements upsets Iran’s fragile 
political environment, manipulating the balance of power between factions in favor of 
introverted coalitions. As a result, the elite coalitions associated with the state are less 
receptive to negotiations and cooperation, creating a whole new set of unintended 
consequences that complicate the nuclear standoff. In this sense, “issuing threats may 
make for good politics but not necessarily good strategy” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 207).
This chapter posits that introverted coalitions thrive under conditions of economic 
isolation. The Revolutionary Guards, in particular, have a clear economic interest in a 
sanctions regime that imposes conditions o f international isolation. This chapter begins 
by highlighting the domestic actors that comprise the Islamic Right. The latter half o f this 
section traces the ensuing internal developments in Iran that contribute to the 
Revolutionary Guards’ hegemony over the economic, political, security and societal 
institutions of the state.
The Islamic Right
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The Conservative Traditionalists represent the largest political faction within the 
Islamic Republic, dominating the regime’s unelected institutions since its creation. Their 
reach extends into nearly every major political and security institution of the state, from 
the Office of the Supreme Leader down to the Iranian parliament, the Majlis. The 
Traditionalists possess primary control over the most important political institutions in 
Iran, including the Guardian Council, which has the authority to vet and ban political 
candidates from elections, and the Assembly of Experts, the organ that selects the 
Supreme Leader. The Traditionalists, like other coalitions with introverted characteristics, 
value national independence as Iran has a long history of foreign intrusions into its 
domestic affairs. As Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, commented in a 2012 
interview, “The most valuable commodity we have - and we cherish it and hold it very 
strongly - is independence. And this is the price we have been paying for the past thirty- 
three years” (Rahimi 2012). The Traditionalists advocate strict cultural purity, national 
self-sufficiency and robust controls on civil society.
The Traditionalists also possess a monopolistic grip on the economy, which 
affords them unrestricted access to resources and unregulated discretion. Article 44 of the 
Islamic Republic’s constitution upholds the idea of a centrally planned economy in which 
the state sector wields control over large-scale industrial sectors as well as foreign trade, 
banking, insurance, power generation, telecommunications; the “mother” industries. State 
domination over the economy is one major reason why the regime is able to offset the 
pain of economic sanctions onto unprivileged domestic groups and why authoritarian 
regimes are better equipped than democracies to survive external economic pressure.
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“Leaders of authoritarian regimes are able to redirect external pressure onto isolated or 
repressed social groups while insulating and protecting itse lf’ (Cortright & Lopez 2000; 
20). Despite unquestionable hardship, the government- also the single most important 
economic actor and sole dispense of petrodollars- enjoys myriad tools to avoid economic 
meltdown” (ICG 2013; 26). For example, rentier states can survive without traditional tax 
bases because of the lucrative income that comes with exporting natural resources, in this 
case, oil. The economic structure of the Iranian economy may influence the effectiveness 
of external instruments through varying audience costs of authoritarian v. democratic 
regimes. “Leaders incur audience costs such as the removal from office or no-confidence 
votes-when they renege on their own public commitments” (Solingen 2012; 17). Since 
the regime is generally able to operate independent of its society (little taxation means 
little representation), Iranian leaders are not as concerned with or sensitive to audience 
costs. “Because domestic audiences can organize politically to overcome collective 
action problems and are endowed with the legal authority to remove leaders from office, 
democratic leaders are expected to be more vulnerable to audience costs than non- 
democratic leaders” (Solingen 2012; 17). With respect to the expectation o f social 
change, according to Cortright & Lopez (2000; 20), there is no assurance that a 
sanctioned population will redirect the pain of external coercion onto political leaders and 
force a change in policy, especially with the authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian 
settings, such as Iran, the elites who are often the targets of the sanctions regime are in 
the best position to control economic activity and the allocation o f scarce resources 
(Cortright & Lopez 2000). It is precisely because Authoritarian regimes have a greater
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array of instruments at their disposal to retain social control and allocate scarce resources 
that they are the most difficult to sanction.
The Rise of the Radicals
Changing political winds have ushered in an era of conservative political 
hegemony that has created strong institutional and bureaucratic pressures on the regime 
to maintain a hardened nuclear posture that ensures tense relations with the West. The 
Supreme Leader and the Office of the President both draw considerable support from the 
IRGC, which has an interest in continuing confrontation with the U.S. (Davies 2012). 
While the ayatollah’s power was previously based on the authority o f  the clergy and a 
complex web of factions and institutions, today it is increasingly based on the IRGC:
By the time Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ascended to the position of 
Supreme leader, Iran’s internal balance o f  power began to change.
Former allies o f the clerical establishment did not appear to be reliable 
legitimating sources for the new leader, who was originally a junior 
cleric from the city o f Mashhad, bereft o f significant theological 
credentials. Possibly to compensate for this, the new Supreme Leader 
cultivated a long term relationship with the armed forces from the 
earliest days of the revolution, and the IRGC was the greatest 
beneficiary of the change in leadership (Wehrey et al. 2009; 80).
The Conservative Traditionalist’s impetus for developing nuclear technology is tied to 
the perception that the nuclear program increases its domestic legitimacy, supports its 
regional ambitions and provides an important deterrent against meddling and foreign 
interlopers. “Much like North Korea, Iran’s nuclear program constitutes an important 
pillar o f the regime’s survival and even political legitimacy” (Nader 2012; 211). Another
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aspect o f Khamenei’s nuclear calculus is based on pragmatic considerations, as giving 
ground to the West on the nuclear program could potentially alienate the Ayatollah and 
his Conservative Traditionalist faction from the guardians of the revolution, the IRGC.
The supreme leader is far from convinced that the benefits o f dealing with the 
enemy outweigh the potential pitfalls posed by declining revolutionary prestige and a 
possible injection of “hedonistic” Western values into Iranian society (Economist 2013). 
Under present conditions, the domestic costs o f abandoning the nuclear program 
outweigh international incentives currently on the table. For the supreme leader, political 
survival would be impossible without his praetorians. The ayatollah’s camp, the 
Conservative Traditionalists, maintain a precarious, albeit necessary partnership with the 
ranks of the Revolutionary Guards. The 2009 uprising undermined the image of the 
Supreme Leader as living above the political fray, making him a target for political 
backlash. The IRGC’s support comes at a high price for Khamenei. Alfoneh (2010; 74) 
suggests, “in return for its assistance against reformist groups such as the Green 
Movement, Khamenei has had to bribe the IRGC with political, economic, and even 
ideological influence.” The waning power o f the Supreme Leader coupled with the 
ascendancy of the Revolutionary Guards has culminated in a domestic political 
environment in which a defiant nuclear posture is politically expedient.
Although the Office o f the Supreme Leader sits atop the official Iranian 
governmental hierarchy, it is the Neo-Principalist faction that has become the most 
influential political, economic and social coalition driving policy choices and collective 
outcomes within Iran. The Radicals or the “Neo-Principalists” are the faction most 
closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is only when
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the IRGC transcends its institutional limits and seeks power as a political actor through 
the principal political institutions (i.e. Majlis, and the presidency) that we can speak of a 
Neo-Principalist faction (Safshekan 2010). The political group encapsulating this “new  
conservative” current includes the Developers o f  Islamic Iran or Abadgaran-e Iran-e 
Islami, which was composed of IRGC and Basij war veterans (Wehrey et al. 2009; 16).
The Revolutionary Guards’ role was traditionally confined to upholding the ideals 
of the Islamic Revolution with an implicit mandate to protect the conservative 
establishment from external as well as internal enemies. Article 150 of the Iranian 
constitution clearly articulates the role of the IRGC, which intentionally divided power 
between the clerics and the IRGC officers. It has since undergone a fundamental 
evolution, becoming a largely autonomous political and economic actor that continues to 
gain both formal and informal influence, rivaling even the Supreme Leader’s political 
coalition. The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized 
political system, in which the president, much of the cabinet, many members of 
parliament, and a range of other provincial and local administrators hail from the ranks of 
the IRGC (Wehrey et al. 2009; xi). Though there continues to be cleavages among the 
ranks of the IRGC, many in the Majlis (parliament) identify with the faction known as 
Osulgarayan, the main bloc of conservatives often referred to as “principalists,” which 
encompasses the supporters of Ahmadinejad as well as unaffiliated conservatives 
(Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani 2011).
Talk o f “working together” and “unity” has permeated the language o f  
the conservative and hardline politicians who are currently running Iran.
This language is not meant to extend to reformist of even centrist 
politicians who have been essentially purged since the 2009 presidential
41
election, but it does indicate a closing of ranks among an even narrower 
circle o f politicians (Farhi 2012a; 3).
Veterans o f the IRGC have maintained a presence in all eight Majlis sessions; however, 
their presence was formerly confined to single digit representation from 1980-2004. After 
2004, the Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in politics grew to unprecedented levels, 
when IRGC veterans won at least 16% percent o f the 290 seats (Boroujerdi & 
Rahimkhani 2011; 2). The newly established political clout of the IRGC officer corps has 
a visible impact on Iran’s foreign policy and its domestic political landscape. Overall, the 
numbers o f parliamentarians with IRGC pedigrees at least doubled between elections in 
2000 and 2008 (Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani 2011).
The Political Economy of the Right
Economic sanctions are forcing the restructuring of the Iranian economy. The 
strategic placement o f IRGC officers throughout the regime’s influential ministries has 
helped the IRGC comer opportunities opened up by this restructuring. “As is often the 
case with sanctions, members of the elite with greatest access to the regime and state 
privileges are best positioned to survive and even thrive in the new environment” (ICG 
2013; 33). The status quo imposed by the international community aids the IRGC’s 
monopolization of key economic sectors and the displacement o f foreign and domestic 
competitors (Wehrey et al. 2009). Comprehensive sanctions and the restrictions on 
foreign imports undercut the economic clout of Reformist and Pragmatist factions who 
rely on international businesses to export the resources necessary for manufacturing. The
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Revolutionary Guards have an economic preference to resist integration with the global 
economy because increased foreign competition would threaten their monopolistic grip 
on lucrative industries and markets. The architects of the nuclear program, the 
Revolutionary Guards, have all too eagerly filled the power vacuum left in the wake of 
the failing, legitimate enterprises o f the moderate coalitions. Kreps and Pasha posit that 
shifts in ownership of capital flows substantiate the claim that external threats strengthen 
introverted coalitions and weaken extroverted coalitions (Kreps & Pasha 2012). “Private 
businesses have suffered especially under sanctions. Meanwhile economic clout is 
concentrated in the hands of a small elite, linked to the Revolutionary Guard, which 
enjoys access to cheap foreign exchange and a virtual monopoly over imports” 
(Economist 2013; 37). In Iran, the near destruction of the private sector caused by 
sanctions has strengthened and expanded the state-controlled segment of the Iranian 
economy (Bahrami & Trita 2012). In the absence of competition from both international 
and domestic corporations for public contracts within Iran, the Revolutionary Guards 
filled that void by purchasing contract bids essentially uncontested. In 2010, for example, 
“the IRGC purchased fifty percent plus one o f  the shares o f  the Telecommunications 
Company of Iran (TCI) from the government for roughly $8 billion- the largest trade in 
the history o f  the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)” (Alfoneh 2010; 76).
The regime embarked on a massive policy to privatize important public assets to 
decrease the level of government spending in the face of economic sanctions. Khamenei 
had to first reinterpret Article 44 o f the Iranian constitution to legally circumvent the 
provision mandating centralized control over the economy. These efforts at privatizing 
public assets represent the expansion o f  the regime’s foremost allies into unprecedented
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areas of the economy. The clerical establishment’s prominent position in the institutional 
hierarchy enabled them to disqualify rival companies of the Islamic Left from 
consideration based on arbitrarily justified “security concerns”. This strategy, to give but 
one example, allowed the IRGC-controlled companies, Toseeh-ye Etemad-e Mobin 
Consortium and Mehr Eghtesad-e Iranian to compete for the TCI bid uncontested.
With the privatization of assets estimated to be worth roughly $120 billion, the 
Iranian leadership expanded from relatively transparent parts of the public sector to parts 
o f the public sector shielded from public scrutiny (Alfoneh 2010). “For all intents and 
purposes, this makes the privatization o f TCI a handover of publically owned enterprise 
to the Revolutionary Guards...yet another calculated step in the organization’s campaign 
to dominate the Iranian economy” (Alfoneh 2010; 77).
The Revolutionary Guard’s silent coup o f  the Iranian economy also extends into 
the country’s most lucrative industry, the oil and gas market. The government of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted its control over the oil and gas sector, 
reducing the power o f the “oil mafia,” dominated by allies of former President Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani (Mohamedi 2013). Enterprises associated with the Islamic Left have 
been replaced with companies most associated with the Revolutionary Guards. Economic 
sanctions curtailed the flow of direct foreign investment to domestic markets, devastating 
legitimate Iranian businesses and essentially eliminating foreign competition from the 
Iranian oil and natural gas sectors. For example, the Khatam al-Anbia (or gharargah 
sazandegi khatam alanbia- abbreviated as Ghorb), the IRGC’s most visible construction 
arm, has strengthened its role throughout the Iranian economy, including the oil and gas 
sector, specifically within the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company
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(NIORDC). In recent years, Iran’s oil ministry signed over billions of dollars worth of 
no-bid government contracts such as the $2.5 billion contract to finish the final phases of 
the South Pars oil field. The Khatam al-Anbia, became the single largest recipient of 
government contracts over the past four years, often bypassing the bidding process 
completely (Safshekan 2010) and being awarded more than 750 contracts in various 
construction, infrastmcture, oil and gas projects (Wehrey et al. 2009; xv). As one of the 
few institutions with the capacity to undertake massive public-works projects, the IRGC’s 
construction contracts helped them build an extensive patronage network in rural areas. 
“The IRGC may calculate that any dissent or blowback over its growing business profile 
and illicit profiteering will be offset by the networks o f patronage and clientage that it has 
built with a myriad o f companies” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 66). The IRGC’s role in spurring 
rural economic development through public-works projects affords it a clear opportunity 
to build a base of rural support that can counterbalance any opposition from more urban, 
entrepreneurial classes, the primary constituents o f the reformist and pragmatic factions 
(Wehrey et al. 2009).
As a result, the IRGC now functions as an expansive socio-political-economic 
conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life 
and society (Wehrey et al. 2009; xi). The subsidiary wings of the IRGC are dedicated to 
ideological outreach efforts via media and education programs, think tanks, youth camps 
etc. and affords the organization popular support in municipal and national elections. 
Much of the Revolutionary Guard’s institutional legitimacy is predicated on these efforts 
at ensuring the ‘cultural defense” of the country which bolsters public support for the 
aging ideals of the revolution.
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The Guards are further able to make good on their redistributive promises to the 
public by using their privileged access to economic institutions that operate in the 
informal sector of the Iranian economy, beyond the purview of regulators. Iranian 
religious foundations, or Bonyads, function as informal avenues through which 
Revolutionary Guards can exert ideological influence over Iranian society. Bonyads were 
originally established through the expropriation o f  the Shah’s former assets that evolved 
into massive conglomerates with the capacity to serve the ideological and cultural needs 
of Revolutionary forces. They operated as religious charitable organizations assisting in 
the reconstruction efforts following the Iran-Iraq war but now have the additional 
function of solidifying a system of patronage to those loyal to the revolution. The 
Revolutionary Guards use of Islamic foundations, bonyads, as a means to extend its reach 
into the Iranian economy and society, enabled the introverted coalitions to counterbalance 
any political pressure from reformist groups in urban areas.
The use of these foundations provides segments of the ruling apparatus with 
potent patronage tools to purchase loyalty and protect core constituencies (ICG 2013). 
“Their major functions were to implement the promises made under a populist social 
safety net parallel to formal social security” (Saeidi 2004; 498). They now operate as 
massive conglomerates shielded from public scrutiny, as they are not legally obligated to 
disclose economic and accounting information. Bonyads operate as [para] 
nongovernmental organizations in a murky pseudo-public [cooperative] sector o f the 
Iranian economy away from the public eye. The bonyads, which account for as much as 
30-40 percent o f Iran’s economy, are not accountable to the executive or legislative 
branches o f government.. .Many bonyads are controlled or staffed by current o f former
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members of the Revolutionary Guards (Nader 2012) such as Bonyad Mostazafan 
(Foundation of the Oppressed) and Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of 
Martyrs and Veterans Affairs).
One of the largest and wealthiest bonyads, the Imam Reza Shrine Foundation, is 
controlled by Khamenei’s loyal acolyte, Ayatollah Vaez Tabbasi and is estimated to have 
accumulated as much as $15 billion through automobile manufacturing, real estate and 
agriculture (Nader 2012; 215). Bonyads represent the dual power structure in Iran that 
reinforces the financial authority o f religious leaders without accountability (Saeidi 
2004). These ideological outreach efforts and control over vital state resources translate 
into tangible political gains for the Revolutionary Guards, co-opting the clerical 
establishment’s clientage and patronage networks and becoming the de facto state in rural 
areas. “The commercialization of the IRGC has the potential to broaden the circle o f its 
popular support by co-opting existing financial elites into its constellation o f subsidiary 
companies and subcontractors” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 55). This translates into a larger, 
diverse demographic of Iranian society in which the Guards are able to exert influence 
and counter any reformist opposition. “Sanctioned states with substantial resources, such 
as oil-rich Iran, are in a position to redistribute among factions and sectors, buy off 
critics, and pay more for what they need” (Stein 2012; 54). This enabled the IRGC to 
transform into a multidimensional actor with vast institutional reach, extending into the 
Iranian economy, government and society.
The Black Market
Outside of its declared enterprises, the IRGC is reported to control an 
underground shadow economy of black-market goods, smuggled into Iran via illegal 
jetties and other entry points that it alone controls (Wehrey et al. 2009; xv). The black- 
market economy is a major source o f revenue for the architects o f  Iran’s nuclear program. 
The IRGC manipulate the sanctions by leveraging control over the black market to 
benefit its protected constituencies. Leaders advancing inward-looking models shield 
favored constituencies including protected industries, military-industrial enterprises, state 
bureaucracies, the under-employed, and segments of the population that are highly 
dependent on states subsidies and military procurement (Solingen 2012).
In addition, the Revolutionary Guards circumvented many of the most 
economically damaging effects of sanctions as their revenues are essentially left 
unscathed by the sanctions regime. There is evidence, albeit anecdotal, that these 
informal networks are the channels through which Iran is able to export its commodities. 
The revenues earned from illicit trading are used for the acquisition of advanced 
weaponry, the development o f nuclear research programs and the general expansion of 
military-industrial spending within Iran. The Guards have a clear, vested interest in the 
nuclear program’s ultimate success, especially in the face o f U.S. and international 
pressure that strengthens its domestic position. There are parallels between the hard-line 
elites’ control over the black-market economy in Iran and in the former Yugoslavia. “In 
the former Yugoslavia, hard-line militia groups used their control of border checkpoints 
and transportation routes to enrich themselves and consolidate political power” (Cortright 
& Lopez 2000; 22).
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The IRGC’s vast networks penetrate strategically vital state institutions and 
important jetties such as the Martyr Rajai Port Complex, which allow them to control 
trafficking operations, unimpeded by government interference. The IRGC is estimated to 
yield a 200-300 per cent profit on illegal sales. “One Majlis member recently stated that 
the IRGC black market activities might account for up to $12 billion USD per year” 
(Wehrey et al. 2009; 67). Other reports claim that, “smuggling is booming as clandestine 
networks are increasingly replacing commercial ones...Smuggling networks are 
becoming an integral part of the shadow economy that reportedly accounts for 21 per cent 
of GDP” (ICG 2013; 37). The Revolutionary Guards harness their control of these 
informal networks to facilitate their economic and political expansion. The importance of 
the hardliners’ expansion o f control over the state’s economic, political and security 
bureaucracies cannot be overstated as this trend has undoubtedly caused Iranian domestic 
politics to shift to the political right.
The immediate implications o f this development is that the black market is 
fostering the rise of informal power structures for introverted coalitions and contributing 
to the lack of accountability and transparency in the Iranian economic and political 
system (ICAN 2012). Economic isolation forces many Iranians to rely more heavily on 
these informal sources of power, empowering the conservative establishment and its 
protectors. In effect the banking sanctions are forcing massive reliance on a cash based 
economy, making already vulnerable Iranians dependent on black-marketeers for the 
transfer of funds to cover educational, health or other legitimate costs of living. As 
ordinary Iranian’s cash savings lose value due to inflation and the currency collapse, they
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rely more and more on the government, on the well-connected elites within its 
institutional hierarchy, and on black-market enterprises dominated by radical coalitions.
The government’s use o f  a multiple exchange rate has helps the regime manage 
the pain of sanctions while giving discounted rates to foreign exchange to its close allies. 
Members of the Revolutionary Guard exploit their privileged access to cheap petro­
dollars because o f their connections with the state. “At the end o f  2011, after a run on the 
currency, officials fixed the exchange rate at 12,260 rials to the dollar to help importers 
(Economist 2013b; 51). For those unfortunate enough not to have government 
connections, the exchange rate is around 24,368 rials to the dollar. This creates a massive 
black-market demand for cheap foreign exchange, which gives the introverted coalitions 
a significant strategic economic advantage over its domestic competitors and accelerates 
its dominance over imports and other vital industries and markets in the Iranian economy.
The growing economic and political power of the IRGC certainly increases its 
sense of political privilege and entitlement, the consequences of which ultimately equate 
into a hardline stance on the nuclear program. Forcing Iranians to move toward a cash 
economy reduces transparency and creates a greater source of illicit trade in the Persian 
Gulf and thus produces more income for military-industrial conglomerate, the IRGC. The 
lack on financial transparency and accountability into Iran’s inner economic workings 
undoubtedly empowers and supports the IRGC’s many illicit activities, as well as its 
control of a shadow economy. As Wehrey et al. (2009) argue:
As an economic organization more interested in monopoly rather than 
open competition, the IRGC may wish to keep Iran’s economy closed o ff  
and under its tight control. Under these circumstances, U.S. and 
international sanctions may not weaken the IRGC, but instead enhance its 
formal and illicit economic capabilities (Wehrey et al. 2009; 71).
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The IRGC’s goal is to continue its social, political and economic expansion within 
Iranian society. The most expedient means of achieving this goal is resisting foreign 
influence, maintaining tension with the West and remaining isolated from the outside 
world. The cacophony of negative inducements imposed on Iran introduces a domestic 
trend in which the radical coalitions thrive. According to Kreps and Pasha (2012; 197), 
for Iran “increased spending on its military-industrial complex along with decreased 
investment and trade freedom (a result of financial sanctions) following the issuance of 
negative inducements point toward an inward reorientation of its government and 
dominant elites.”
Conclusion
Negative inducements (threats of war and comprehensive sanctions) have the 
aggregate effect o f heightening Iran’s sense o f insecurity. Negative inducements, 
including bellicose rhetoric from U.S. and Israeli leaders, inadvertently manipulate the 
domestic coalition balance of power in Iran and lessened the political-economic obstacles 
for the IRGC’s rise to power. Iran’s sense o f  insecurity is instrumentalized by the IRGC 
as their raison d’etat for developing the nuclear program despite the rising costs o f doing 
so. A cursory glance at a map o f the post 9/11 Middle East reveals Iran’s precarious 
security situation. Iran is surrounded by unstable and/or hostile governments, U.S. 
warzones, allies and military bases and an other nuclear powers such as Israel,
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unrestricted by the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) or any of the international institutions 
currently demanding Iran’s compliance.
Since 2006, the increasing number of punitive measures imposed on Iran has only 
served to convince growing numbers o f  the population o f the West’s malicious intent, 
igniting their revolutionary ardor for sacrifice and resistance. Sanctions create a siege 
mentality that justifies a prolonged national state of emergency in Iran, making it easier 
to protect Islamist right constituencies, suppress dissent and divert attention away from 
governmental failings (e.g. economic mismanagement of the Ahmadinejad 
administration). Politicizing the nuclear crisis is part and parcel o f  the IRGC’s larger 
strategy o f igniting their base of support, legitimizing their institutional mandate as 
providers o f  the ‘sacred defense’ for the country and most importantly, keeping their 
coffers full. As Davies notes, “U.S. attempts at economic isolation have given the Iranian 
government a plausible scapegoat for internal economic problems” (2012; 324). Threats 
have perpetuated Iran’s sense o f strategic vulnerability and made it easier for Iran’s 
Islamist right to justify a more radical foreign policy agenda, in which nuclear 
proliferation served as their primary tool to guarantee the country’s defense. As analyzed 
in the previous chapter, the state of emergency also constrains domestic competitors that 
may otherwise interfere with the political and economic campaign of the IRGC.
With autonomous private enterprise in demise and the expansion of the IRGC into 
newly-privatized industries, the IRGC expanded its patronage networks and charity 
operations. “Whether real or exaggerated, this threat perception has had the effect of 
deepening and broadening the IRGC’s populist and mobilizing outreach into virtually 
every geographic, economic, and societal sector o f Iran” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 32). With
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more and more people becoming dependent on the state for basic goods and services, 
hardliner groups have sought to replace the once vital civil society organizations, 
augmenting the scope of conservative influence in impoverished rural and urban areas. 
Forcing ever increasing numbers of Iranian citizens to become dependent on the 
economically stable IRGC for survival removes countervailing power centers that 
potentially challenge their hegemony. According to Arthur Stein (2012; 53), sanctions 
become problematic only when the sanctioned state does not have market power and 
must obtain the acquiescence o f others. This is not the case in Iran, as the state-controlled 
segments o f the pseudo-public sector currently flourishing are controlled by groups 
associated with the IRGC, providing introverted coalitions with additional mechanisms to 
manage the economic pain of sanctions. This is one instance in which “broad economic 
sanctions not only intensify pressure on politically weak groups, but enables the target 
government to manipulate the effects o f sanctions to benefit their supporters and 
constituencies” (Bahrami & Trita 2012).
The popular notion that isolating Iran from the international community will 
eventually persuade its leaders to become better global citizens must be revisited. 
Increasing Iran’s isolation will continue to provide opportunity structures for the 
introverted, hardliner groups to protect their economic interests and will therefore 
strengthen their clenched grip on the formal and informal decision-making apparatus of 
the state.
Sanctions can be economically effective and politically self-defeating 
when they exact economic pain but serve to strengthen the sanctioned 
regime. This occurs both because the state increases its power relative to 
society and because the factions supporting the state are strengthened 
relative to those opposed to it. There is no small irony and tragedy in the
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ability of sanctions to impose greater costs on a sanctioned regime’s 
opponents than its supporters (Stein 2012; 47).
As the concluding chapter will emphasize, despite conventional wisdom, diplomacy 
coupled with military threats and instruments used to damage the Iranian economy are 
not compatible. Introducing positive inducements such as reintegrating Iran into the 
global economy could possibly undermine the introverted coalition’s protectionist 
economic policies and disrupt its formidable patronage networks, creating new 
opportunity structures for the moderate coalitions to exploit. Loosening the broad-brush 
sanctions and thus, removing the convincing threat narrative may reverse the current 
trajectory and provide an additional avenue of pressure that can be exerted on the regime 
and stymie the political expansion of the hardliner coalition.
54
Chapter IV
Towards a Strategic Alternative:
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
There are many misconceptions in Washington regarding the relative 
effectiveness of sanctions that have immense implications on the course o f negotiations. 
Washington currently finds itself at a crossroads; interpreting sanctions as a success may 
prompt policy makers to remain patient and wait for the optimal moment when the 
Iranian economy is on the verge of collapse so to get the best deal from the Iranian 
interlocutors. Conversely, measuring Iran’s overall economic performance may indicate 
that despite the hit to the Iranian economy, the dominant factions of the Islamist right are 
finding ways to adjust to the impact o f sanctions, which would, in turn, harden the 
Iranian’s negotiating position.
Mainstream analyses tend to present Iran’s economic predicament as a ‘zero-sum 
game’ in which Iran will either succumb to U.S. demands or continue to absorb the 
pressure. What this mode of analysis tends to obscure is how sanctions are absorbed by 
Iran’s political elite in a continuous and dynamic fashion (Yong & Hajihosseini 2013). 
From an international relations theory perspective, a neo-realist approach to assessing the 
impact of sanctions is inadequate because it assumes that states are unitary actors. Neo­
realists tend to discredit the domestic level o f analysis, asserting that it is not particularly 
useful in determining whether sanctions are “working” or not. However, assuming that
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the state actors constitute one cohesive polity leads to oversimplifications regarding the 
distributional impacts of negative inducements and to what extent they impact the 
motivations and interests of the influential actors of that state. Different pressures and 
opportunities exist for each actor and must be taken into consideration to effectively 
assess the role of one measure over another. Reorienting the analytical focus of sanctions 
assessments from the system level to the domestic level o f analysis is the way in which 
this research contributes to the discipline as a whole.
The distributional effects of sanctions among different actors will play a large role 
in shaping the Iranian regime’s decisions on the nuclear program (Nader 2012; 212). 
Changing the nuclear calculations of the clerical establishment necessitates a policy that 
is sensitive to the dynamic and fractured political environment in Iran, and takes into 
account which policies will empower the moderates or undermine the ultra-conservative 
belligerents. Recognizing possible cleavages and potential points of leverage between 
actors requires an understanding of the internal workings of the Iranian state as well as an 
awareness of elite coalitions’ material incentives that influence their calculations and 
behavior. It is for that reason that this research employed a political economy focus on 
the elite coalitions in Iran and their access to the resources and power of the state.
Though the realist theoretical perspective itself is insufficient in analyzing the 
impact of sanctions on the domestic environment o f the targeted state, realist thinkers 
such as Kenneth Waltz come to similar conclusions regarding the overall ineffectiveness 
of comprehensive sanctions. The inclusion of theorists from multiple disciplines in 
international relations theory is not to suggest inconsistency in the theoretical framework 
of this research. It suggests that there are a growing number of academics coming to
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similar conclusions, albeit for different reasons, regarding the consequences of economic 
sanctions. The ineffectiveness o f sanctions in terms o f achieving their stated objective 
transcends the traditionally drawn lines of political theory.
This thesis has found that two variables in the domestic environment, “coalition 
type” and “regime type”, mediate the impact of comprehensive sanctions and threats of 
war (i.e. negative inducements). In the case of Iran, negative inducements are weakening 
the Islamic Left while strengthening the political legitimacy and economic clout of the 
Islamic Right. In previous chapters, I discussed how negative inducements displace the 
more moderate traditional elites in both the political system and the economic structure of 
Iran. The use of military threats shift the domestic balance of power between elite 
coalitions that strengthen introverted factions, enabling their further control over 
important ministries of the state and the trajectory of Iran’s foreign policy. The sanctions 
imposed on Iran create a siege mentality that supports the threat narrative o f the clerical 
establishment, enabling them to justify and frame economic pain as a revolutionary 
sacrifice and repress oppositional voices under the guise o f national security. The regime 
uses nationalistic sentiments to strengthen the resolve of an otherwise war-weary 
population, deflect criticism, and improve internal cohesion. The pervasive influence of 
hard-line factions on the political and economic institutions of the state allows them to 
adapt to the dynamic Iranian economy that is constantly adjusting to the impacts of 
sanctions. As these extroverted players are marginalized, the IRGC not only fill the 
economic vacuum they leave behind, but also continue to gain their political influence as 
well (Alfoneh 2010). In addition, the humanitarian crisis produced by economic sanctions 
will continue to alienate larger numbers of ordinary Iranians and make it increasingly
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difficult for moderate factions within the government to justify an improved relationship 
with the U.S. and the rest of the international community. Policies that accept that Iranian 
citizens merely constitute a form of collateral damage may lead more and more 
vulnerable citizens into the arms of the conservative and radical coalitions, further 
marginalizing the reform movement and its agenda. In the absence of moderate voices 
within the Iranian political hierarchy, there will be little hope of exerting the pressure on 
the regime, translating civilian suffering into tangible policy change or witnessing a 
change in course on the Iranian side of the nuclear issue. These factors ultimately impact 
Iran’s level o f receptivity to external pressure and willingness to cooperate in regards to 
nuclear proliferation, further emboldening the Iranian regime and its allies to resist 
external pressure regardless of the mounting costs. The following section brings together 
lessons from past non-proliferation success stories and the implications of the current 
non-proliferation efforts on the prospect of reaching a diplomatic solution to the nuclear 
crisis. These cases lend support to the claim that comprehensive sanctions are 
disconnected from their stated policy objectives and in various instances, escalate 
tensions to the point that war must inevitably follow.
Lessons from Other Cases
Over the past 60 years, there have been a few nuclear non-proliferation success 
stories such as, Taiwan, and South Korea. A key lesson can be extrapolated from these 
success stories. As J.I. Katz of Washington University points out, one cause of 
nonproliferation success was democratic transition combined with a security guarantee
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from a dominant power that removed the strategic necessity for an independent nuclear 
force, as was the case for South Korea (Katz 2008). Thus, this case highlights an 
important condition for the success o f non-proliferation initiatives: the need for security 
assurances and reform. This logic is strikingly absent from the current non-proliferation 
strategy toward Iran. I have already analyzed how the current sanctions regime is 
weakening the economic and political power of moderate factions, urban middle classes, 
and civil society groups that would be expected to push for further democratization in 
Iran’s political system. This is not to assume that in the absence o f negative inducements 
democratization would occur but rather under the current circumstances, the groups most 
likely to support democratization and reform are unable to exert sufficient pressure on the 
regime to induce policy change. In addition, instead of removing the strategic necessity 
for a nuclear deterrent, U.S. rhetoric and action similarly proved to Iran that it is under 
threat by a superpower. The strategic environment of the Middle East following the U.S. 
incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan provided a greater degree o f security for the Islamic 
Republic. The U.S. military intervention in Iraq supplanted Saddam Hussein’s Sunni 
Baathist regime and replaced it with a Shi’ite-controlled government. The Taliban, Iran’s 
Sunni rival to the East, was similarly removed from power and replaced by another U.S.- 
allied regime, that o f Hamid Karzai. The removal o f  Iran’s closest strategic threats to its 
East and West similarly removed the need for a nuclear deterrent. However, it was 
Washington’s veiled threats toward Iran following the 2002 State of the Union speech 
that forced Iran’s leaders to recalculate their strategic position in the Middle East in 
relation to the newly assertive rogue hegemon. Thus, it was the actions of Washington 
that convinced Tehran of the strategic necessity o f a nuclear deterrent.
59
We can also ask what lessons can be learned by U.S. participation in sanctions 
regimes against other Middle Eastern states, namely Iraq and Syria. There are substantial 
differences between Iraq, Syria and Iran, geographically, politically, economically as well 
as the factors that warranted the use of sanctions. The sanctions themselves were also 
applied through different mechanisms. The sanctions against Iran and Iraq, for example, 
were implemented within the United Nations Security Council framework whereas the 
sanctions levied against Syria were exerted through U.S. executive orders. However, 
there is an overriding commonality between the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian cases that is 
worth consideration. In all of these instances, there has been a fundamental disconnect 
between the stated objectives o f economic sanctions and what actually takes place within 
the target country. This perilous gap between proposal and practice has been responsible 
for dramatic loss of life, the deterioration o f living standards within the target countries 
and the overall worsening of the conditions that sanctions were intended to resolve.
In the Syrian case, “sanctions have already exerted a high economic cost on the 
population of Syria, especially on vulnerable and poor people, and already lowered the 
quality of life” (SCPR 2013; 63). Similar to the impact of financial sanctions on Iran, the 
difficulties of importing substantial goods and services due to the financial sanctions, 
embargo imposed by several countries, and the currency depreciation have had a negative 
impact on the livelihoods of people, including the lack of imported essential medicine 
and energy sources (SCPR 2013). In the midst o f all this suffering endured by the civilian 
population, the sanctions have not brought the Syrian regime closer to a cessation of 
violence nor has it altered the calculations o f its leaders. The sanctions have, however,
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helped to hinder Syria’s development progress as the population diverts resources from 
productive to destructive activities.
Iraq is yet another instructive case o f the failure of sanctions to fulfill its specified 
goal. The goal of the Iraqi sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council was originally 
to inflict sufficient costs on Iraq’s economy to convince the regime to withdraw its army 
from Kuwait. This episode serves as yet another example o f the failure of sanctions, since 
the Iraqi army did not withdraw until U.S. military intervention expelled it in 1991 
(SCPR 2013). According to a report conducted by Dr. Mary Smith Fawzi for the U.N. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the sanctions on Iraq did not achieve its purpose, 
however, it did inflict insurmountable pain the Iraqi people, the poor and disenfranchised 
and is responsible for the deaths o f over 500,000 children under the age o f five. For this 
reason, “the tendency to see economic sanctions as “below” the use o f military force on 
some imagined ladder o f foreign policy escalation must be revised” (Haass 1997; 79). 
Sanctions have historically been a prelude to war, not a tool to quell instability or 
deescalate tensions.
These cases illustrate that sanctions weaken society and do not induce radical 
factions or leaders to compromise on what they see as important domestic security and 
economic imperatives. Economic warfare thinly veiled as diplomacy is not moving the 
U.S. closer to their non-proliferation goals and therefore, alternative strategies that are 
attentive to the internal political dynamics o f Iran must be formulated. In other words, 
there is compelling evidence from these aforementioned cases to suggest that 
comprehensive sanctions simply do not work.
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Recommendations
While sanctions have shown little effectiveness, there is also no silver bullet 
strategy available to dissuade Iran’s leaders from developing its nuclear technology, 
whether for peaceful purposes or for weapons. Any strategy aimed at altering this 
trajectory will inevitably fall short of its goals. Negotiations would have to proceed from 
recognition on the part of the U.S. that Iran does, in fact, have an unalienable right to the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology. Article IV o f the NPT (to which Iran is a signatory) 
specifies rights of state parties to the treaty to engage in nuclear research geared toward 
peaceful uses, such as power generation or production of isotopes with medical utility 
(Bali 2006). As in all cases, and so with Iran, the costs or imperfections of one strategy 
over another can only be measured in comparison to the potential costs of alternative 
strategies (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). The section below lays out a range o f possible 
strategic options currently on the table for consideration as well as their counterfactual 
implications, starting with the most ill-advised policy option to the more plausible one.
The Pre-emptive - Rollback Option
A preventive war waged against Iran would be a foreign policy mistake on a scale 
that is unprecedented. Strategic thinkers tend to refer to the military option as a rollback 
strategy, in which military force is used to topple a hostile or aggressive regime. The 
Bush Administration was quick to judge this option as the most effective strategy at their 
disposal following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Rollback strategies tend to
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be myopic in the sense that they fail to consider the domestic blowback and the possible 
spillover of the conflict into neighboring countries. It can be argued that the U.S. 
currently employs are less extreme variation of this policy as rollback can encompass the 
use of diplomatic or economic sanctions in the hopes that such pressures will provoke the 
demise of the targeted regime (Dueck & Takeyh 2007).
According to a 2012 report by the Federation of American Scientists, the 
estimated cost of a full-scale U.S. invasion on Iran could cost more than $1.7 trillion 
(USIP 2012). Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. military intervention 
would actually destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Targeted air strikes might delay the 
program but such a move would ignite the revolutionary fervor that empowers the IRGC 
and its conservative allies, as well as provoking a nationalist backlash that would justify 
the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Many in the ranks o f the Revolutionary Guard believe 
that regime change is the true motivation behind American action and confirming their 
suspicion would make the prospect of diplomacy a distant memory. As Kahl argued, “a 
U.S. attack would likely rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners, 
increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to 
building a bomb” (2012; 171). In the event of a pre-emptive strike by the West, figures 
like Khamenei would have little choice than to cede to domestic pressure and weaponize 
its civilian nuclear program (CFR 2012).
Unfortunately, in Iran, the domestic costs of making concessions outweigh the 
international inducements presently available to incentivize cooperation. The prevailing 
paradigm in Iran regarding diplomatic engagement is that negotiations are pointless 
because any concessions on the Iranian’s part will lead to further impositions, weakening
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their position both internationally and domestically. Even the most valuable prize the 
U.S. and its European allies could offer—normalization of relations and the integration of 
the Islamic Republic into the world community— could conflict with the worldview of 
dominant actors in Iran, specifically the IRGC, and undercut their power (Jervis 2013). 
With the Revolutionary Guards behind the helm of the most influential policy-making 
institutions in Iran, any policy realignment toward moderation will presuppose their 
removal from power. This expulsion from power will not come at the hand of foreign 
interlopers but rather from the competing domestic coalitions in Iran. The internal 
dynamics of Iran will have a significant impact on the direction o f the nuclear policy. Of 
course, these are rough approximations of the costs of escalation, nevertheless, it is clear 
that any type of military escalation to the current standoff would not only be detrimental 
to the U.S. but to the global economy as well.
Containing the Revolution
The U.S. has primary relied on a strategy of containment throughout its turbulent 
relationship with Iran. Containment generally requires deploying a military 
counterweight around the state to be contained. While the U.S. accomplished this to a 
large extent with its system of bilateral alliances in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a 
credible military threat plays into the narrative o f the Islamic Right, justifying increased 
military spending and the harsh repression o f domestic competitors. Prolonging the 
conflict with the West is an effective means for the IRGC and other radical groups to 
rekindle popular support for the Islamic revolution’s fading elan (Dueck & Takeyh
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2007). In addition, a policy of containment and a policy of engagement are mutually 
exclusive. Using a strategy of diplomacy while reiterating the potential of a military 
reprisal for non-capitulation is like trying to negotiate while firmly planting a gun to your 
counterpart’s head. It is counterproductive to consider making security assurances while 
at the same time threatening security.
The harsh, warlike rhetoric of the U.S. (spanning both the Bush and Obama 
presidencies), Israel and other European nations plays into the narrative created by the 
hardliner coalitions that there is a clear and present danger necessitating a nuclear 
deterrent and fierce repression of internal dissent. As discussed in chapters II and III, 
threats, whether they are economic, military or rhetorical, produce a range of unintended 
consequences. One of the most significant consequences is the shift in power between 
domestic coalitions. Rhetorical threats and restrictive measures solidified conservative 
political hegemony over the domestic political and economic institutions of the state.
In contrast, depriving the regime of the notion that there are barbarians at the 
gates (Coetzee 1980) or an exaggerated external enemy, the regime would no longer be 
able to use diversionary tactics to frame their own economic mismanagement as an 
international plot to undermine the legitimacy o f the regime. The notion of institutional 
reform would no longer be synonymous with treason or a ploy by the U.S. and internal 
dissidents to topple the regime; but rather, something that is necessary to improve the 
health of the Iranian economy and political system. Hardliner groups in Iran already 
believe that the U .S.’s primary aim is not the stabilization o f the region but the 
weakening of the regime; therefore intensifying the military component o f U.S. policy 
would only confirm their suspicions. Moreover, “adding still more sanctions now could
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make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of 
the ultimate deterrent” (Waltz 2012; 2). Jumhuri-ye Islami, a conservative newspaper in 
Iran, similarly noted that, “the core problem is the fact that our officials’ outlook on the 
nuclear dossier of Iran is faulty... It seems they have failed to appreciate that America is 
after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for them” (Dueck & 
Takeyh 2007; 195).
For negotiations to be successful, U.S. non-proliferation policy toward Iran must 
focus on the demand-side of the nuclear equation. In other words, what factors contribute 
to Iran’s pursuit o f uranium enrichment? There must be some recognition on the part of 
the U.S. o f Iran’s regional context and its security concerns. “It must be emphasized from 
the outset that for all the factions involved in this debate, the core issue is how to 
safeguard Iran’s national interests” (Dueck & Takeyh 2007; 195). Therefore, Washington 
needs to convince Tehran that negotiations are not designed to weaken its regional 
position or a clandestine effort at regime change. To build this degree of trust, the U.S. 
must consider a strategic alternative to the present course, one that moves from how to 
contain Iran to how to engage Iran.
Engagement through Integration
The sanctions regime threatens Iran’s bond to the global economy. In early 
February, President Barak Obama signed into law a new round o f sanctions that aim to 
further isolate Iran from the global economy by targeting its energy and media sectors 
(Gallup 2013). “Instead o f helping to promote a developmental state whose behavior is
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moderated by the multi-faceted links created, the sanctions regime strives to sever those 
links based on the claim that those links will eventually make the Islamic Republic a 
better global citizen” (Fahri 2012b). Limiting Iran’s role in the global economy is no 
doubt hurting legitimate businesses in Iran but economic isolation is being used to the 
advantage of hardline coalitions who are the principal architects of the nuclear program. 
For example, the regime manipulated the collapse o f the rial to empower the regime’s 
closest allies, notably the Revolutionary Guards. The decline in the value of the rial 
equates to a reduction in foreign imports and the removal o f foreign companies from 
Iranian markets. Since foreign imports are too expensive for the average Iranian to afford, 
the consumption pattern of the population has shifted from the purchasing o f foreign 
goods to domestic products. Therefore, the domestic coalitions who wield dominant 
control over the lucrative Iranian markets are the direct beneficiaries of this stimulation in 
domestic production caused by the financial sanctions.
The government and its revolutionary allies use their soaring profits to further 
their redistributive and populist policies to gain the support of the poorest sectors of 
society, who are typically the first to engage in collective action. Since 2006, rural 
households have actually seen a rise in their median income per capita along with the 
bottom 10% in the urban population (Salehi-Isfahani 2012). The use of cash transfers, as 
a way to bring oil revenues to the dinner table, constitutes an important component of the 
regime’s extensive patronage network to retain the support of the conservative rural and 
urban poor. Meanwhile, under sanctions, the wealthier middle and upper classes, which 
are generally liberal, experienced rising unemployment and political marginalization as a 
result of their waning economic clout.
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The removal of foreign companies means the removal o f competition and allows 
for domestic companies to establish a monopoly in their respective markets. This 
dynamic allowed for a reduction in transparency, an increase in corruption, and the 
empowerment of the coalitions who are well connected to the government. Companies 
who rely on foreign imports or lack government connections, such as those in the 
Reformist and Pragmatist camps, are left at a competitive disadvantage to their 
revolutionary counterparts. According to Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, an expert economist 
and former researcher at the Iranian Central Bank, these private sector businesses 
currently owe the central bank over $17 billion in debt. The sanctions regime is 
threatening Iran’s bond to the global economy, not only through the straight-jacketing of 
the middle class and private sector, which is the promoter o f that bond, but also hindering 
the point of view supportive of economic integration (Farhi 2012b; 1).
Instead of severing Iran from the global economy, there must be an effort to 
create more interdependencies so to increase mutual interests, communication, 
information and possibly the spread of democratic values. “Continuity in relations 
provides opportunities to assess the actions of others in order to reward good behavior 
and punish uncooperative behavior” (Keshavarzian 2007; 16). Economic interaction is 
desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems and benefits 
extroverted coalitions who rely on international markets as a source o f their political 
strength. Market economic reform also reinforces the development o f civil society. The 
use of engagement as a strategy o f integration uses diplomatic and economic contact as a 
strategy in itself in the hopes of creating patterns o f cooperation, integration, and 
interdependence between two hostile states (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). “After years o f  zero
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relations and a torrent o f propaganda from both capitals, mistrust is endemic” (Economist 
2013a; 36). In contrast, continuity of diplomatic relations reduces uncertainty about the 
preferences of others, and the accumulation of precedents helps diminish bargaining costs 
associated with transactions (Keshavarzian 2007). The lesson gleaned from the thought 
experiment called the Prisoner’s Dilemma personifies the current stalemate between Iran 
and the West on the nuclear file. In the absence o f transparency and communication, 
cooperation is virtually impossible to obtain. Not only is cooperation impossible to obtain 
under these conditions, but the uncertainty vis-a-vis the motivations and preferences of 
the dominant actors creates a spiral o f insecurity (see Jervis 2009) that risks escalating 
tensions to the point of no return.
Critics of a strategy of engagement through integration believe that it badly 
underestimates the hostility of most factions within the Iranian government toward the 
U.S. (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). However, this critique does not take into consideration the 
aforementioned fact that isolating Iran from international markets strengthens the 
domestic factions most hostile to the U.S. while alienating their moderate counterparts.
Above all, the U.S. has a strategic interest in creating a good relationship with the 
Iranian people, as the objective of economic sanctions is to change the calculations of 
Iran’s leaders, which necessitates the support o f the Iranian society. A  good place to start 
would be to stop threatening Iran. A positive step in this direction would be to remove the 
sanctions that have done the most harm to the Iranian population. In the context of 
Washington’s political gridlock, it would require more political capital than the President 
currently possesses to repeal the oil sanctions on Iran. It would be nearly impossible to 
loosen these restrictive measures as a way to entice Iranian cooperation because doing so
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would require the support of Congress, which favors a more confrontational demeanor 
toward Iran. Under the current circumstances, it is unrealistic to believe that the oil 
embargo is going away anytime soon. “Across a wide political spectrum in Washington 
“compromise” remains a dirty word when it comes to Iran. Yet, as a bevy of 
commentators and think-tank specialists urge the offering bigger incentives may be the 
only way to persuade Iran to lower the diplomatic drawbridge” (Economist 2013a; 36).
In sum, the clenched fist policy toward Iran is counterproductive to U.S. goals. 
The carrot should come in the form of a relaxation on the financial sanctions imposed on 
Iranian society. Reintegrating Iran into the global economy does not necessarily mean 
that the U.S. must open its own markets to Iran; it would be an incremental process of 
loosening some of the more draconian coercive measures such as restricting specialized 
medicines while encouraging U.S. partners to reopen trade relations with Iran.
This is not to promote a strategy of appeasement in which the U.S. makes 
unilateral concessions in the vague hope of obtaining Iranian cooperation. As chapter II 
illustrated, the financial and banking sanctions exasperated a humanitarian crisis in Iran 
that has reoriented public anger on the regime toward the West. The humanitarian crisis 
effectively removes the ‘transmission mechanism’ needed to translate the suffering o f  
Iranian citizens into tangible grassroots pressure on the regime. The financial sanctions 
are responsible for the demise of civic activism in Iran by destroying the connective 
structures, the financial tools required for sustained collective action and by suffocating 
the reform movement.
The culmination o f these factors offers an alternative narrative to Washington’s 
claim that sanctions are effective in strangling the Iranian economy and therefore, likely
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to trigger the demise of the regime. A  closer look reveals that financial sanctions are the 
most counterproductive to U.S. interests. Loosening these sanctions could possibly 
restore the Reformist and Pragmatists’ former economic primacy as well as domestic 
balance o f power between moderate and hardline coalitions. In addition, President 
Obama has a lot more latitude on financial sanctions than he does in regards to oil 
sanctions. The President has discretion over removing or loosening the financial 
sanctions, as doing so does not require authorization from congress. “Policymakers could 
promise and deliver sanctions relief as a part of the overall effort to build confidence, 
induce gradual shifts in behavior, and reinforce contours o f  a new relationship” (CFR 
2012; 65).
The political costs of loosening sanctions can be managed because if this strategy 
ultimately yields no positive results than new sanctions can always be reapplied. 
Resolving the nuclear quagmire in the form of the U.S. removing outdated economic 
penalties, such as financial sanctions or restrictive measures imposed around the time of 
the Iranian Revolution, could add over $60 billion in revenues to the global economy and 
build the trust needed to come to a diplomatic solution. There is a common 
misconception that economic sanctions are far less economically costly than war. In some 
respects this is true. However, there are costs borne by U.S. businesses forced to forgo 
commercial opportunities in Iran (CFR 2012). Another round of U.S. sanctions on 
transactions with Iran’s central bank could potentially cost the global economy billions of 
dollars in lost revenue. If President Obama is serious about offering an extended hand to 
Iran instead o f a clenched fist as he claimed in 2009, then putting an end to the financial 
sanctions is as good a place as any to start.
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Conclusion
This research set out to find a causal story to explain the impacts o f sanctions on 
the political economy of Iran’s elite coalitions, which could be applied to similar cases 
and help guide policy-makers on which course o f action would be most appropriate. In 
Iran, these negative inducements have allowed for the strengthening of introverted 
coalitions as economic isolation has enabled them to further entrench their ability to 
strengthen their monopolies, core protected constituencies, the military-industrial 
complex, notably the Iranian nuclear program, and their tight grip on the levers of state 
power. At the same time, the impacts o f negative inducements have been much different 
for extroverted elite coalitions, specifically the reform movement and its key allies. 
Comprehensive sanctions coupled with military threats undermine these groups’ ability to 
attract foreign investment and strengthen its ties to the international environment. These 
conditions undermine the might of extroverted coalitions who, derive their economic and 
political power through greater integration with the global economy and are the advocates 
of a conciliatory nuclear policy. In terms of the Iranian case and other instances in which 
negative inducements are used, additional attention on the political economy of the elite 
domestic coalitions who influence the direction o f their country’s nuclear policy is a vital 
consideration in determining how to craft negative or positive inducements, as well as 
when their use will produce the desired outcome. Not only do current non-proliferation 
strategies increase Iran’s insecurity and undermine the forces needed to initiate reforms 
and moderate Iran’s foreign policy, these strategies play into the hands o f groups that
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have an interest in isolating the country from the global economy, thus making 
denuclearization less likely (Solingen 2013).
This analysis illustrates the ways in which the impacts o f economic sanctions are 
distributed unevenly across the political spectrum of Iran and other states. As stated in the 
introductory chapter, the domestic receptivity to external sanctions and inducements is 
contingent on the specific attributes of the domestic political landscape (Solingen 2012). 
Positive and/or negative inducements must reflect the reality o f the domestic political 
environment and be cognizant of the pressures and opportunities that exist for important 
domestic elite coalitions. In instances where they do not accurately reflect the reality of 
the domestic political environment, counterproductive, unintended consequences are 
likely to manifest. According to Stein (2012; 47), for sanctions to be politically as well as 
economically successful they must attack the bases o f state power, they must impose 
costs on the elite and its supporting coalition (in this case the ruling elite is the 
conservative traditionalists and their primary elite ally is the IRGC) and relatively 
strengthen forces opposed to the government and its policies.
An underlying theme o f this thesis is that current U.S. policy instruments are out 
of alignment with policy objectives. The examples presented throughout the preceding 
chapters have highlighted how the stated objectives o f economic sanctions do not match 
the reality in Iran and elsewhere. The economic, social and humanitarian spillover of 
negative inducements impacts the broader political environment in such a way that 
strengthens the targeted state. If the U.S. continues to rely on negative inducements such 
as threats of war and economic sanctions to achieve their non-proliferation goals, Iran’s 
level of receptivity and willingness to cooperate on the issue of uranium enrichment will
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continue to diminish and events will continue to transpire in a way that is 
counterproductive to U.S. policy objectives. Alternatively, as suggested throughout this 
work, leading political figures in the Islamic Right have built fortunes and political power 
bases around adapting to sanctions, so removing or loosening sanctions might actually 
harm rather than help them (Jervis 2013). Depriving the Islamic Right of an external 
enemy will make the task of selling a radical foreign policy agenda increasingly difficult. 
As economic conditions improve for ordinary Iranians so too will the possibility that 
diplomacy will once again resume. Thus, policy-makers must seriously consider 
grappling with the notion that the most relied upon diplomatic instrument in the U.S. 
arsenal must be abandoned.
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